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COMMENT
NEVER GOING HOME: DOES IT MAKE US
SAFER? DOES IT MAKE SENSE?
SEX OFFENDERS, RESIDENCY
RESTRICTIONS, AND REFORMING RISK
MANAGEMENT LAW
CALEB DURLING*
One of the most hotly debated issues in criminal law today is how to
manage the perceived risk of sex offenders loose in the community. Beyond
mandatory registration and community notification, over a dozen states,
including Illinois, have enacted residency restrictions that forbid sex
offenders from living within a certain distance of schools, parks, day care
centers, or even "places where children normally congregate. " This
Comment scrutinizes these laws to see if they make sense, and more
importantly, if they make us safer. The answer to both questions appears to
be no. After detailing the statistical, political, and constitutional problems
that render these restrictions ineffective and unconstitutional, I shift my
attention to envisioning a better system of risk management. I end by
critically examining best practice methods of states across the country that
more effectively allocate finite resources to identify and control high risk
offenders to prevent them from harming again, while allowing the vast
* Several people deserve recognition for helping me throughout this process. First,
thanks to Benno Weisberg, Becca Stem, Myra Sutanto Shen, and the editorial staff at the
Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology for their thoughtful comments and suggestions
from the first rambling draft to the last. Second, thanks to my parents, Mary and Russell
Durling, and my siblings, Jacob Durling and Thea Durling. Last, my profound gratitude to
my wife, Shannon Durling, for her support, love, and patience throughout a year and a half
of hearing about sex offender laws.
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majority of offenders who are low risk to better re-integrate into and
become productive members of society.
I. INTRODUCTION: MEET PATRICK LEROY
Patrick Leroy is thirty-seven, and has lived almost all of his life with
his mother in East St. Louis, Illinois,' one of the state's-and nation's-
poorest communities. In 1987, when Leroy was eighteen, he was convicted
of an unspecified sexual offense,2 for which he served six years in prison.
As a result of this conviction, Leroy is now considered a sex offender,
mandating that he annually register his address with, and pay a registration
fee to, the local authorities for the rest of his life, or be sentenced to up to
three years in prison for noncompliance . Since being released over a
dozen years ago, he has lived in his mother's house and committed no
further sexual offenses.5
In July 2000, Illinois passed a sex offender residency restriction law.
6
The law forbade anyone convicted of a sex offense from living within five
hundred feet of playgrounds, schools, or day care centers.' The ban applied
prospectively and retrospectively, exempting only those who owned a
house within the five hundred foot buffer at the law's inception from having
to move.8 Violation of the residency restriction law in Illinois is a felony,
punishable by one to three years in prison.9 Leroy's mother's house, where
Leroy had lived all of his non-incarcerated life, is located within five
hundred feet of Miles Davis Elementary School. 10
1 People v. Leroy, 828 N.E.2d 769, 785, 788 (Ill. App. Ct. 2005) (Kuehn, J., dissenting),
appeal denied, 839 N.E.2d 1032 (Ill. 2005).
2 The exact offense has not been noted in the court proceedings. Id. at 784 (Kuehn, J.,
dissenting). The Illinois sex offender database has recently updated Leroy's entry, now
listing his crime as "Criminal Sexual Assault/Force" with a "victim over the age of 18."
Welcome to the Illinois Sex Offender Registration Information Website provided by the
Illinois State Police, http://www.isp.state.il.us/sor/ (enter "Leroy" under "Last Name" in
"Offender Search.") (last visited Oct. 25, 2006) [hereinafter Leroy Database Entry]. This
new information begs the question why Leroy is even in the registry at all, if his victim was
not a minor (and he himself was only eighteen when the incident occurred).
3 Leroy, 828 N.E.2d at 788 (Kuehn, J., dissenting).
4 See 730 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/5-8-1(a-6) (2005); id. 150/2, 3, 7, 8 & 10; Leroy, 828
N.E.2d at 775.
5 Leroy, 828 N.E.2d at 785, 793 (Kuehn, J., dissenting).
6 Id. at 784-85 (Kuehn, J., dissenting).
7 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/11-9.3(b-5) & 9.4(b-5).
8 Id. Thus the sex offenders who had been renting a now-noncompliant residence would
have to move.
9 Id. 5/11-9.3d & 9.4e; 730 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/5-8-1(a-6).
10 Leroy, 828 N.E.2d at 785 (Kuehn, J., dissenting).
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Leroy was charged in August 2002 with violating the residency
restriction statute." In the ensuing trial and appeal, Leroy argued that these
new restrictions violated his substantive and procedural due process rights,
his right to equal protection, his right against self-incrimination,
prohibitions against ex post facto laws, and prohibitions against cruel and
unusual punishment. 2 The Fifth District of the Illinois Appellate Court
rejected all these considerations; 13 the Illinois Supreme Court denied his
appeal;14 and now Patrick Leroy cannot live in his mother's house.15
The three-member panel's decision was not unanimous, as Judge
Kuehn dissented vigorously to the "expulsion" of Patrick Leroy.' 6 Judge
Kuehn, in detailing the constitutional infirmities of the residency restriction
law, 17 noted that the law's enforcement would result in a lifetime ban
against Leroy returning to his longtime home, where he had lived without
incident for thirteen years since release from prison.'
8
Patrick Leroy's story is not unique. He is just one of many former sex
offenders now caught in an escalating movement to publicly identify and
stringently control sex offenders in order to prevent the next graphic sex
crime against children. Sex offenders are vilified and feared; their crimes
considered our "society's worst nightmare."' 19 But while legislators gain
notoriety in this "race to the bottom"'20 for passing laws banning sex
offenders from living near day care centers, schools, parks, libraries, pools,
and recreations trails, larger questions loom: Have these laws made our
children safer? More to the point, do these sex offender restrictions make
sense? If these "Scarlet Letter" 21 laws are not effective, what system would
ensure better sex offender risk management without wasting scarce public
"l Id. at 775.
12 id.
"3 Id. at 774-84.
14 People v. Leroy, 839 N.E.2d 1032 (Ill. 2005).
'" Leroy, 828 N.E.2d at 785 (Kuehn, J., dissenting).
16 See id. (Kuehn, J., dissenting).
17 Id. at 785-93 (Kuehn, J., dissenting).
18 Id. at 785 (Kuehn, J., dissenting).
19 Jennifer McKinney, Comment, Washington State's Return to Indeterminate
Sentencing for Sex Offenses: Correcting Past Sentencing Mistakes and Preventing Future
Harm, 26 SEATTLE U. L. REv. 309, 319 (2002).
20 Recent Legislation--Criminal Law, Sex Offender Notification Statute-Alabama
Strengthens Restrictions on Sex Offenders, 119 HARV. L. REv. 939, 946 (2006) [hereinafter
Alabama Strengthens Restrictions].
21 Dwight Merriam, The 2005 ZiPLeRs: The Eleventh Annual Zoning and Planning Law
Report Land Use Decision Awards, ZONING & PLAN. L. REPr., Feb. 2006, at 5 (awarding the
State of Iowa a dubious "Scarlet Letter Award" for its broad residency restrictions, which
had the effect of banning sex offenders from living in many of the state's communities).
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funds policing and onerously burdening those low-risk offenders like
Leroy, who have lived without trouble down the street from schools, parks,
and nurseries for many years?
To answer these questions, the Comment is divided into three main
parts, considering residency restrictions as a microcosm of the larger
problem of effective and constitutional sex offender risk management.
Section II traces the recent development of sex offender laws and the
resulting pariah-like status of sex offenders in contemporary America.22
Sections III and IV specifically focus on residency restrictions, first
scrutinizing their scientific, economic, and political problems before
analyzing the ex post facto constitutional infirmities with the laws.23 The
conclusion from Sections III and IV is that uniformly applied residency
restrictions will probably fail judicial scrutiny, and in any case are
ineffective in preventing sex offender recidivism.
24
The Comment's last part takes up the policy question of what states
should implement in lieu of ineffective and unconstitutional uniformly-
applied residential restrictions. Section V examines best practices for
managing sex offender risk that have been implemented across the country,
considering how each one works and its particular benefits and problems.
Finally, Section VI proposes a synthesized method of managing sex
offenders, which achieves the paramount goal of protecting children by
targeting the minority of offenders who are high risk while relaxing
restrictions on the vast majority of offenders who studies have shown do
not re-offend.26 This synthesized risk management strategy better allocates
scarce public resources, allays public fear, and withstands constitutional
27scrutiny.
II. BACKGROUND
This section examines the political and social conditions that have led
to the residency restrictions that forced Patrick Leroy to leave his mother's
home. In turn, this section considers the political and legislative response
to sex offenders, the mechanics of residency restrictions, the public's
perception of sex offenders, and the judicial treatment of sex offenders.
22 See discussion infra Section II.
23 See discussion infra Sections III & IV.
24 See id.
25 See discussion infra Section V.




A. THE POLITICAL RESPONSE TO SEX OFFENDERS
Strict laws that specifically target sex offenders are a recent
innovation. After several well-publicized brutal sexual assaults and
murders of children by previously convicted sex offenders living
inconspicuously near their victims, states began to pass "Megan's Laws" in
1990.28 The laws are named after Megan Kanka, a seven-year-old girl from
New Jersey who was victimized and then killed by a neighbor who
community residents did not know was a twice-convicted sex offender.29
Megan's Laws, also known as sex offender registration acts (SORAs),
require offenders to register promptly when they are released from prison,
and also mandate that sex offenders convicted in the past now register
themselves with their local police department. 30 The goal is to put a face on
sex offenders, so they can no longer prey as strangers on the most
vulnerable members of society. 3' The laws, although state-created, became
essentially mandatory when Congress passed legislation conditioning 10%
of all federal law enforcement funding to the state on the state having an
acceptable sex offender registration law.
32
Despite sex offenders being the only class of convicted felons
generally forced to register and have their names and pictures posted on
websites accessible to the general public, 33 legislators and local officials
have since sought even harsher measures. The mayor of Albuquerque
proposed posting sex offenders' photos and descriptions at the zoo and
other places where children congregate because he believed that an offender
had "'Danger: Will re-offend' virtually stamped on his forehead., 34 When
28 Alabama Strengthens Restrictions, supra note 20, at 939.
29 See Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84, 89 (2003); Humma Rasul, Review of Selected 1998
California Legislation: Crimes: Dangers in Numbers: California Updates its Version of
Megan 's Law and Steps Further to Protect Our Children from Sex Offenders Living
Together in Group Homes, 30 McGEORGE L. REV. 528, 529 (1999); Leslie Henderson,
Comment, Sex Offenders: You Are Now Free to Move About the Country. An Analysis of
Doe v. Miller's Effects on Sex Offender Residential Restrictions, 73 UMKC L. REV. 797, 816
(2004).
30 See, e.g., Smith, 538 U.S. at 90.
31 Rasul, supra note 29, at 529.
32 Smith, 538 U.S. at 89-90; Rasul, supra note 29, at 529.
33 See, e.g., Welcome to the Illinois Sex Offender Registration Information Website
provided by the Illinois State Police, http://www.isp.state.il.us/sor/ (last visited Oct. 26,
2006).
34 Michael Duster, Note, Out of Sight, Out of Mind: State Attempts to Banish Sex
Offenders, 53 DRAKE L. REV. 711, 719-20 (2005). The mayor then prodded the city council
to pass tougher registration restrictions than those of the state's, including requiring sex
offenders to give a DNA sample and dental implants when registering in the city. See Am.
Civil Liberties Union v. Albuquerque, 137 P.3d 1215, 1219, 1225-26 (N.M. Ct. App. 2006).
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asked about the constitutional rights of the offenders that were possibly
being violated by this proposed law, the mayor replied that the "offender
surrendered his rights when he committed his first attack," and so "his
rights should not be taken into consideration when formulating a sex
offender policy." 35 For Halloween 2005, state officials in South Carolina,
county officials in Cook County, Illinois, and city officials in Rochester,
New York, all placed prohibitions on sex offenders having any contact with
Halloween festivities. 36 The increasingly onerous restrictions have led one
commentator to conclude: "Politicians, even in honest attempts to protect
the public good, sometimes go too far without considering unintended
consequences. 37
B. RESIDENCY RESTRICTIONS
Thirteen states, including Illinois, have passed laws in the last five
years banning sex offenders from living within a certain distance of
schools, parks, day care centers, and "places where children normally
congregate. 38 Residency restrictions are justified as a means of "taking
These restrictions were in the end mostly rejected as constitutionally infirm. See id. at 1220,
1223.
35 Duster, supra note 34, at 720.
36 In South Carolina and Rochester, case workers were on duty that night to make
random checks to ensure no sex offenders left their house. Clif LeBlanc, Child Sex
Offenders Restricted Monday; Some Say Effort Won't Help Children, THE STATE (Columbia,
S.C.), Oct. 28, 2005; Halloween Banned for Sex Offenders, RNEWS, Oct. 29, 2005,
http://www.rnews.com/print.cfi?id=31579. In Illinois, a new law banned sex offenders
from handing out Halloween candy or being Santa Claus during the Christmas season.
Charles Thomas, Police Have Eye on Sex Offenders for Halloween; Law Bans RSOs from
Giving Out Candy, ABCLocAL/WLS-TV, Oct. 31, 2005, http://abclocal.go.com/wls/
story?section=local&id=3591021. The county sheriffs went and checked on all 1300
convicted sex offenders living in the county, leaving a hanger on the sex offender's door to
"serve as a Halloween night alert for parents." Id. The penalty for a sex offender found
giving away candy would be a felony punishable by up to three years in prison. Id.
37 Merriam, supra note 21, at 5.
38 ALA. CODE § 15-20-26 (2005) (convicted sex offenders cannot live or work within two
thousand feet of school or child care facility); ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-14-128 (2005) (high risk
sex offenders cannot live within two thousand feet of school or day care center); CAL. PENAL
CODE § 3003 (Deering 2005) (parolees cannot live within thirty-five miles of victim or
witnesses; certain offenders cannot live within one quarter mile of primary school); FLA.
STAT. ANN. § 947.1405(7)(a)(2) (West 2005) (sex offenders whose victims were minors
cannot live within one thousand feet of a school, day care center, park, playground, or
location where children normally congregate); GA. CODE ANN. § 42-1-13 (2005) (registered
sex offenders cannot live within one thousand feet of child care facility, school, or area
where minors congregate); 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/11-9.3(b-5) & 9.4(b-5) (2005) (child sex
offenders cannot live within five hundred feet of school, park, or day care center); IOWA
CODE § 692a.2a (2005) (convicted sex offenders of minor cannot live within two thousand
[Vol. 97
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away a portion of the opportunity" for sex offenders to re-offend.39 In
terms of width of the prohibited zone, they range from a five hundred foot
restriction in Illinois 40 to two thousand feet in Alabama and Iowa.4 1 Oregon
has adopted a "general prohibition" against sex offenders living "near
where children reside. 42  In terms of prohibited locations, most states'
restrictions encompass school and child care facilities, and sometimes parks
and the current location of the particular offender's victim. 43 Georgia's law
also includes a vague proscription against living within one thousand feet of
any area "where minors congregate. 4 4 These residency restriction laws,
like previous sex offender laws, have been generally applied not just
prospectively to offenders being sentenced in the future and currently
imprisoned or on parole, but also retrospectively to anyone previously
convicted of a "sex offense. 45
feet of a school or child care facility); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 17.495 (2005) (registered
offenders on supervised release cannot live within one thousand feet of school or child care
facility); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:91.1 (2005) (sexually violent persons cannot live within
one thousand feet of schools without school superintendent's permission); OHIO REV. CODE
ANN. § 2950.031 (Lexis 2005) (sex offenders cannot live within one thousand feet of
school); OKLA. STAT. 57 § 590 (2005) (prohibits sex offenders from residing within two
thousand feet of schools or educational institutions); OR. REV. STAT. §§ 144.642, 144.644
(2005) (general prohibition against sex offenders living "near" where children reside); TENN.
CODE ANN. § 40-39-211 (2005) (sex offenders cannot live within one thousand feet of
school, child care facility, or victim). Alabama has recently toughened their sex offender
restrictions, including a ban on a sex offender working within five hundred feet of a
restricted use or loitering within five hundred feet of a "business or facility having a
principal purpose of caring for, educating, or entertaining minors." Alabama Strengthens
Restrictions, supra note 20, at 941 (quoting 2005 Ala. Act. No. 2005-301).
39 Henderson, supra note 29, at 799 (quoting Staff and Wire Reports, Court Hears Sex
Offender Challenge, IOWA CITY PRESS, Apr. 1 2004, at A). See discussion supra Section
III.A on why this justification has no statistical or scientific basis.
40 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/11-9.3(b-5) & 9.4(b-5) (child sex offenders cannot live within
five hundred feet of school, park, or day care center).
4 1 ALA. CODE § 15-20-26 (convicted sex offenders cannot live or work within two
thousand feet of school or child care facility); IOWA CODE § 692a.2a (convicted sex offender
of minor cannot live within two thousand feet of a school or child care facility).
42 OR. REV. STAT. §§ 144.642, 144.644 (general prohibition against sex offenders living
near where children reside).
43 See, e.g., 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/11-9.3(b-5) & 9.4(b-5) (child sex offenders cannot
live within five hundred feet of school, park, or day care center); TENN. CODE ANN. § 40-39-
211 (sex offenders cannot live within one thousand feet of school, child care facility, or
victim).
44 GA. CODE ANN. § 42-1-13 (2005) (registered sex offenders cannot live within one
thousand feet of child care facility, school, or area where minors congregate).
45 Courts and observers have criticized as overinclusive the list of criminal convictions
which have been deemed "sex offenses" for purposes of sex offender registration and now
residency restriction statutes. See Doe v. Miller, 405 F.3d 700, 726 (8th Cir. 2005), cert.
2006]
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Smaller units of government have also enacted residency restrictions.
Cities and counties across the country have passed residency restrictions.46
The restrictions include extensive bans, such as 2500 feet around anywhere
children congregate in Miami Beach, Florida,7 and expanding the list of
restricted areas to also include public pools, libraries, and multi-use
recreation trails in several Iowa counties and communities. 48 In addition,
quasi-govermental units like common interest communities have added
covenants banning sex offenders altogether from their communities. 4
The laws grandfathered some offenders living within the restricted
areas, but not all. Illinois, for example, exempted those sex offenders who
owned houses within restricted zones from moving when the law came into
being, but did not exempt longtime renters or those, like Leroy, who lived
with a relative who actually owned the home. 50 Also, a convicted sex
offender who had been renting a house which was not in a restricted zone
when the law was enacted would be in violation of the law if at any point in
the future one of the restricted uses, like a day care facility or a playground,
denied, 126 S. Ct. 757 (2005); People v. Leroy, 828 N.E.2d 769, 792 (I11. App. Ct. 2005),
appeal denied, 839 N.E.2d 1032 (I11. 2005); Stephen Young & Bryan Brickner, This Man Is
Not a Sexual Predator, CHI. READER, Oct. 21, 2005, § 1, at I (reporting on an Illinois man
who murdered a teenager during a gang-related robbery when he was twenty-one, and who is
now being forced to register as a child molester since he murdered an adolescent).
46 Megan McCurdy, Case Note, Doe v. Miller, 38 URB. LAW. 360, 361 (2006)
(discussing an Iowa county and city that were expanding residency restrictions in the wake
of the Eighth Circuit's Doe v. Miller decision upholding the restrictions' constitutionality);
Kyle Alspach, Council votes to ban sex offenders, SENTINEL-ENTERPRISE (Fitchburg, Mass.),
June 21, 2006, at Al, A2 (discussing restrictions in Massachusetts communities); Greg
Bluestein, New Ga. law limits places sex offenders can live, BOSTON GLOBE, June 24, 2006,
at A3 (discussing residency restrictions in Bibb County, Georgia, and Miami Beach,
Florida); Maria Cramer, Fitchburg joins effort to restrict sex offenders, BOSTON GLOBE, June
22, 2006, at B1, B7 (discussing residency restrictions in Revere and Fitchburg,
Massachusetts); Pamela MacLean, Suit Tests Power of Sex Offender Bans; Six Cities Want to
Copy Law; They Wait for Result, NAT'L L.J., Oct. 3, 2005, at 6 (discussing new residency
restrictions in Issaquah, Washington and elsewhere).
47 Bluestein, supra note 46, at A3.
48 McCurdy, supra note 46, at 361.
49 See Brett Jackson Coppage, Student Article, Balancing Community Interests and
Offender Rights: The Validity of Covenants Restricting Sex Offenders from Residing in a
Neighborhood, 38 URB. LAW. 309, 309-10 (2006) (describing the adoption of these
covenants as "spreading like wildfire"). The one court faced with a challenge of such a
covenant upheld its restriction in Mulligan v. Panther Valley Property Owners Ass 'n. See
Mulligan v. Panther Valley Prop. Owners Ass'n, 766 A.2d 1186 (N.J. Super Ct. App. Div.
2001); Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, Information Asymmetries and the Right to Exclude, 104
MICH. L. REv. 1835, 1844-45 (2006); Coppage, supra, at 315-16.
50 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/11-9.3(b-5) & 9.4(b-5) (2005).
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were to be built within the proscribed five hundred feet of his rented
property.
51
C. PUBLIC PERCEPTION AND RESPONSE TO SEX OFFENDERS
Sex offender restrictions have met with resounding public support. It
is not a stretch to say that child sex offenders are the bogeymen of our
day.52 A recent Gallup poll found that 66% of people surveyed were "very
concerned" about sex offenders, whereas only 52% were as concerned
about violent crime, and just 36% worried as much about terrorism. 53 Sex
offenders invite fear because of their sordid and well-publicized crimes
against children, 54 and because many believe (incorrectly)55 that sex
offenders re-offend at a much higher rate than other criminals. 6 Celebrities
from Oprah Winfrey to Bill O'Reilly have advocated for harsher
punishment and more stringent surveillance of convicted offenders. 7
Syndicated columnist Ann Landers, whose advice columns appear in one
thousand newspapers across the country, recently concluded, "The only
molesters who can be considered permanently cured are those who have
been surgically castrated.,
58
Communities across the country have treated released sex offenders
like pariahs. 9 In the fall of 2005, Cook County began a movement to
51 See id. A federal court in Georgia presented with this challenge to the law dismissed it
as merely hypothetical. See Doe v. Baker, No. Civ. A. 1:05-CV-2265, 2006 WL 905368, at
*5 n.4 (N.D. Ga. Apr. 5, 2006).
52 See, e.g., Luis Rosell, Sex Offenders: Pariahs of the 21st Century?, 32 WM. MITCHELL
L. REV. 419 (2005) (reviewing JOHN Q. LA FOND, PREVENTING SEXUAL VIOLENCE: How
SOCIETY SHOULD COPE WITH SEX OFFENDERS (2005)).
53 The Greatest Fear, THE ECONOMIST, Aug. 26, 2006, at 25.
54 See Alabama Strengthens Restrictions, supra note 20, at 939, 943; McKinney, supra
note 19, at 309, 318-19.
55 See infra Section III.A, which details the strong statistical evidence gathered by social
scientists and government statisticians that sex offenders re-offend at much lower rates than
do other criminals.
56 See, e.g., Henderson, supra note 29, at 802 n.34.
57 In the fall of 2005, Oprah began offering $100,000 rewards for the apprehension of
fugitive sex offenders, pictures of whom she would display on her show and on her website.
Oprah's Child Predator Watch List, http://www.oprah.com/presents/2005/predator/
predator.main.jhtml (last visited Nov. 10, 2006). Bill O'Reilly shamed the State of
Alabama into "getting tough" on sex offenders when he deemed Alabama to be among the
states that "don't seem to care about this issue at all," prompting the state legislature to pass
stricter residency restrictions and sentencing measures. See Alabama Strengthen
Restrictions, supra note 20, at 942.
58 Eileen Fry-Bowers, Note and Comment, Controversy and Consequence in California:
Choosing Between Children and the Constitution, 25 WHITTIER L. REV. 889, 910 (2004).
59 See, e.g., Mark Hayward, Registered sex offenders in the community: From prisoners
2006]
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ensure that no bus stops were placed near sex offenders' homes, in order to
prevent offenders from preying on unsuspecting children as they waited for
the school bus.6 ° In the first year of this initiative, school systems shifted
the bus stops, but already one resident argued that instead, the sex offenders
should be forced to move: "They should get rid of the sex offenders. Kids
shouldn't have to go through that., 61  A sex offender in California who
completed the state sex offender treatment program and then underwent
voluntary castration while in prison was still turned down by at least 120
rehabilitation facilities upon release, and neighbors refused to allow him to
move in with his father in the State of Washington.62 As a result, he now
lives in a trailer on the grounds of a California prison.63
Sex offenders also risk bodily harm for being on the list. In April
2006, a Canadian man accessed Maine's online registry, and used the
personal information available on it to locate and kill two offenders before
killing himself.64 In response, Maine only briefly shut down the "popular"
website. 65 As one state representative put it, "[Just] because two people that
were on the website were horribly killed doesn't take away the need for that
website. ' 66
No convicted sex offenders hold major political office. Indeed, in
New Hampshire in the fall of 2005, a heated controversy arose whether a
state elected official should resign because he had employed a convicted
sex offender who had been cited on several occasions for failure to
67register. At one point, the Republican councilman faced calls from the
to pariahs, UNION LEADER (Manchester, N.H.), Jun. 4, 2006, at Al.
60 School Bus Stops Located Next to Sex Offenders 'Homes; Most Schools Act Quickly to
Move Bus Stops, NBC5/WMAQ-TV, Oct. 7, 2005, http://www.nbc5.com/news/5072660/
detail.html.
61 Id. Georgia authorities have since done just that, using their state's residency
restrictions around "where children congregate" to conclude that sex offenders cannot live
within one thousand feet of any school bus stop in the state. See Bluestein, supra note 46, at
A3. These bus stops can and do change every year. See id.
62 Fry-Bowers, supra note 58, at 914.
63 id.
64 John Ellement & Suzanne Smalley, Sex crime disclosure questioned, BOSTON GLOBE,
Apr. 18. 2006, at Al.
65 Id.
66 Id. The article also mentioned a New Hampshire man charged with attempting to
murder two men he found in that state's registry, and a Washington man recently sentenced
to forty-four years for killing two men he located in that state's online registry. Id.
67 John DiStaso, Granite Status: Governor Wants Answers on Sex Offender Getting State
Jobs, UNION LEADER (Manchester, N.H.), Oct. 6, 2005, at A2; Tom Fahey, Resign, Burton
Told Again, UNION LEADER (Manchester, N.H.), Oct. 6, 2005, at Al. The official, Raymond
Burton, is on the Executive Council, an elected body that serves within the executive branch
of the New Hampshire state government advising the governor.
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entire New Hampshire Congressional delegation, who were all
Republicans, as well as the state's Democratic governor to resign.
68
Thus, the public both hates and fears sex offenders, resulting in
approval of ever increasingly harsh penalties for these political pariahs.
69
Indeed, no state which has passed a residency restriction statute has
repealed it, and Alabama has recently enhanced its law with more
restrictions on where sex offenders can live, work, and even loiter.7 °
D. JUDICIAL RESPONSE
Courts from across the nation have generally approved of unusually
harsh punishments meted out to sex offenders. Judges have conditioned the
release of offenders on them placing signs on their front lawns identifying
themselves to all passersby as sex offenders. 71 A federal district court judge
in Arizona was twice overruled by the Ninth Circuit for imposing rigorous
probation restrictions on a man facing marijuana charges who had been
72convicted fifteen years earlier of sexual contact with a teenage female. A
twelve-year-old boy in Illinois was permanently banished (along with his
family) from his community, and made to register as a sex offender for the
rest of his life, a shockingly harsh sentence handed out by a juvenile court
and upheld by the state's supreme court.73
68 Burton did not end up resigning, although in the end, this may have had as much to do
with the notorious New Hampshirite resistance, especially among those from the poor North
Country, to having others tell one what to do. See Paula Tracy, GOP Fundraiser Becomes
Burton 'Love Boat' Cruise, UNION LEADER (Manchester, N.H.), Sept. 30, 2005, at A5;
DiStaso, supra note 67, at Al.
69 Alabama Strengthens Restrictions, supra note 20, at 939, 943.
70 Id. at 939, 942.
7 1 Rosell, supra note 52, at 424.
72 United States v. T.M., 330 F.3d 1235, 1237-39 (9th Cir. 2003). The man pled guilty to
a marijuana charge in 1996 but was sentenced to a rigorous probation, including no internet
access, no contact with children, and no possession of a camera when the sentencing judge
found out the defendant had a dropped child molestation charge from 1961 and had been
convicted of sexual contact with a teenage female in 1981. Id. The Ninth Circuit remanded
the case, noting that "[s]upervised release conditions predicated on twenty-year-old
incidents, without more, do not promote the goals of public protection and deterrence." Id.
at 1240. At this point, the district court, instead of relaxing the probation requirements as
directed by the Ninth Circuit, added another condition: that the probationer could not drive a
car because he had driven the teenager during the 1981 incident. United States v. T.M., 118
F. App'x 286, 287-88 (9th Cir. 2004). The Ninth Circuit then reversed the district court's
second terms of probation, including a harshly written directive that the district court must
follow its instructions this time. Id. at 289.
73 In re J.W., a Minor, 787 N.E.2d 747, 750-53, 757-66 (I11. 2003). Although allowing
that what the minor did, forcing five-year-old boys to perform sexual acts on him and dogs,
was particularly shocking, Chief Judge McMorrow still noted in her special concurrence, "I
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When addressing challenges to the constitutionality of sex offender
laws, both federal and state courts have generally deferred to legislative
findings, upholding first the SORAs
74 and later residency restriction laws.
75
But this judicial trend of upholding all uniformly applied restrictions of sex
offenders may not last forever, as already Justice Kuehn and others have
vigorously dissented over the constitutionality of residency restrictions.76
The next two sections of this Comment will examine residency restrictions
in more detail, concluding that the restrictions are neither constitutional nor
effective in preventing sex offender recidivism.
III. FOUR NON-CONSTITUTIONAL CONCERNS WITH RESIDENCY
RESTRICTIONS
There are four principal concerns with residency restrictions, apart
from their constitutional frailties: that the laws are based on two flawed
premises; that they become a heavy tax burden on the government; and that
they provoke two real estate crises, first in the already undesirable
communities where sex offenders often end up living, and second, for the
low-income sex offenders themselves. Section III takes up each of these
critical concerns in turn.
recognize a certain tension between a lifetime reporting requirement and the philosophical
underpinnings of our juvenile justice system," in which crimes committed as a juvenile are
supposed to not create adult criminal liability. Id. at 766 (McMorrow, C.J., specially
concurring). See also Judge Kilbride's dissent in part expressing his concern that the
juvenile court, which has relaxed constitutional protections for the defendant, could hand out
such a harsh adult criminal sentence. Id. at 770 (Kilbride, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part).
74 See, e.g., Conn. Dep't of Pub. Safety v. Doe, 538 U.S. 1 (2003) (upholding
Connecticut's SORA), Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84 (2003) (upholding Alaska's SORA);
People v. Malchow, 739 N.E.2d 433 (I11. 2000) (upholding Illinois's SORA).
75 See, e.g., Doe v. Miller, 405 F.3d 700 (8th Cir. 2005), cert. denied, 126 S. Ct. 757
(2005) (upholding Iowa's residency restriction law); Lee v. State, 895 So. 2d 1038 (Ala.
2004) (upholding Alabama's residency restriction law); Mann v. State, 603 S.E.2d 283 (Ga.
2004) (upholding Georgia's residency restriction law); People v. Leroy, 828 N.E.2d 769 (Il.
App. Ct. 2005), appeal denied, 839 N.E.2d 1032 (11. 2005) (upholding Illinois's residency
restriction law); State v. Seering, 701 N.W.2d 655 (Iowa 2005) (upholding Iowa's residency
restriction law).
76 See, e.g., Miller, 405 F.3d at 723-26 (Melloy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part); Leroy, 828 N.E.2d at 784-93 (Kuehn, J., dissenting); Seering, 701 N.W.2d at 671-72
(Wiggins, J., specially concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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A. TWO FLAWED SCIENTIFIC ASSUMPTIONS ABOUT RESIDENCY
RESTRICTIONS
Residency restrictions are justified by two flawed scientific and factual
premises: that sex offenders target unknown children in their neighborhood
to commit many of their offenses and that sex offenders re-offend at a much
higher rate than other felons." The Georgia legislator who sponsored the
state's residency restriction justified the measure for both reasons, claiming
that sex offenders are "virtually impossible to rehabilitate and these crimes
are so difficult to detect and control, [that] those persons who are convicted
of sexual offenses against children ... are apt to be repeat offenders.,
78
Both of these claims are false.
First, the image of the stranger sex offender harming neighborhood
children is far from reality. Studies have shown that it is not strangers, but
"[r]elatives, friends, baby-sitters, persons in positions of authority over [a]
child, or persons who supervise children [who] are more likely than
strangers to commit a sexual assault., 79 Indeed, one study found 80% of
abused girls and 60% of abused boys are harmed by people that they know,
either a friend or a family member.80  Another study concluded that
strangers commit no more than 10% of all child molestation cases.81 A
2003 Department of Justice survey confirmed this, indicating that among
the incarcerated child sex offenders in state prisons in 1997, only 7% were
in prison for crimes where the victim was a stranger to the assailant. 82 The
implication, then, is that laws should focus on preventing sex offenders
from harming children whom they know, and not fixate on preventing the
rare attacks by strangers.83 Unfortunately, "[l]egislators [instead] tailor sex
77 See, e.g., Miller, 405 F.3d at 707-08, 714-16; John La Fond & Bruce Winick, Sex
Offender Reentry Courts: A Proposal for Managing the Risk of Returning Sex Offenders to
the Community, 34 SETON HALL L. REV. 1173, 1180-81 (2004); Samantha Imber, Crimes and
Offenses, Sexual Offenses: Prohibit Sexual Predators from Residing Within Proximity of
Schools or Areas Where Minors Congregate, 20 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 100, 101 (2003).
78 Imber, supra note 77, at 101 (footnote omitted).
79 Duster, supra note 34, at 717.
80 Id.; see also The Greatest Fear, supra note 53, at 25.
81 Rosell, supra note 52, at 420.
82 PATRICK A. LANGAN, ERICA L. SCHMITT' & MATTHEW R. DUROSE, U.S. DEP'T OF
JUSTICE, RECIDIVISM OF SEX OFFENDERS RELEASED FROM PRISON IN 1994 36 (2003),
available at http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/pdf/rsorp94.pdf.
83 An article on common interest communities' residency restrictions of sex offenders
reached a similar conclusion:
What's particularly revealing about the proliferation of sex offender residency restrictions is the
relationship between homeowners associations' restrictions on sex offenders and those same
associations' lack of restrictions on potential purchasers who have committed even more serious
crimes (such as murder) or crimes more likely to target proximate strangers (such as burglary
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offender bills to the local or national high-profile crimes that rouse public
outrage and horror... [even though] the vast majority of sexual abuse is
committed by acquaintances or family members of the victims, not sexual
predators lurking in the bushes. 84 Some experts even contend residency
restrictions do more harm than good, as they lull the public into a false
sense of security from stranger sex offenders when the vast majority of
predators meet their victims through jobs, volunteering, or social
networks.85
Furthermore, studies have not shown a correlation between a sex
offender's "residence['s] distance from a school or child care facility, and
an increased likelihood of recidivism." 86  A California newspaper
conducted a review of nearly five hundred released sex offenders who lived
legally near schools and day care facilities. 87 The newspaper found that
only one of the five hundred was arrested during the one year period, and
that was for committing a parole violation and not another sexual assault.
88
Rather, psychologists conclude that if a sex offender wants to re-offend, he
will do it; and "it doesn't really matter how close the school is."
89
Similarly, a Minnesota Department of Corrections study determined that the
only two recidivist acts of child sexual assault committed in parks on
unknown victims occurred several miles away from the offenders' homes,
leading the department to conclude that a five hundred foot or even one
mile restriction would not likely prevent the rare offender who wanted to
harm again.90
The second spurious claim made about sex offenders is that they re-
offend at an "astronomically" 9' higher rate than do other criminals,
justifying the harsh restrictions placed uniquely on them among all felons.92
and automobile theft).
Strahilevitz, supra note 49, at 1890.
84 Alabama Strengthens Restrictions, supra note 20, at 943.
85 Bluestein, supra note 46, at A3.
86 Duster, supra note 34, at 752.
87 Henderson, supra note 29, at 811.
" Id. at 811 & n.92.
89 Duster, supra note 34, at 753.
90 Id.
91 Henderson, supra note 29, at 802 n.34 (quoting an Indiana state legislator candidate
saying, "[w]ith the recidivism rate astronomically high for sex offenders, I prefer to embrace
the 'better safe than sorry' approach").
92 See, e.g., Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84, 103 (2003) ("The risk of recidivism by sex
offenders is 'frightening and high."' (quoting McKune v. Lile, 536 U.S. 24, 34 (2002))); Doe
v. Miller, 405 F.3d 700, 707-08, 714-16 (8th Cir. 2005), cert. denied, 126 S. Ct. 757 (2005);
People v. Huddleston, 816 N.E.2d 322, 339-40 (Ill. 2004); McKinney, supra note 19, at 318
(stating that sex offenders should be treated differently because they have a "high recidivism
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However, extensive private studies refute this claim. In 1998, a massive
study of 29,000 sex offenders found recidivism rates of 12.7% for child
molesters over five years.93 Admittedly, at least one survey found a higher
total, with a 1991 study finding child molesters had a recidivism rate of
31% for sexual crimes and 43% for any violent act.94 But a meta-analysis
of studies of sex offender recidivism rate concluded that the studies'
aggregate recidivism rate for sex offenses was 10-15% within five years
and 40% within fifteen to twenty years.
95
Government statistics have also concluded that sex offenders re-offend
at a far lower rate than do other offenders. In 2003, the Department of
Justice (DOJ) published a comprehensive study of sex offenders released
from prison in 1994.96 Of those sex offenders and rapists released from
prison in 1994, only 14% were recidivists at that point.97 Of those child
molesters released in 1994, only 3% were rearrested within three years for a
sexual offense against a child, and 14% were rearrested within three years
for any violent offense.98 All told, 39% of released sex offenders were
rearrested within three years, but half of those arrests were for "public order
offenses" like parole violations or traffic infractions.99
These recidivism rates were markedly lower than those of other felons;
as "compared with other ex-cons, sex offenders were paragons of virtue." 100
The DOJ's internal study concluded that 68% of prisoners released in 1994
were rearrested for any offense (including minor ones) within three years,
with 68-74% of property criminals and 50-67% of drug offenders
rearrested.' 0' A British study of adult men released from prison in 2002
produced even more striking results, as 85% of those convicted of theft
rate").
93 LeRoy Kondo, The Tangled Web-Complexities, Fallacies and Misconceptions
Regarding the Decision to Release Treated Sexual Offenders from Civil Commitment to
Society, 23 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 195, 199 (2002).
94 Id. at 200-01. It is unclear for how long that study tracked the group of sex offenders.
9' Id. at 202.
96 LANGAN, SCHMITT & DUROSE, supra note 82.
9' Id. at 11.
98 Id. at 1, 35.
99 Id. at 35 (data showing that 39% of released sex offenders were rearrested within three
years, with 20% rearrested for public order offenses).
100 The end of innocence, ECONOMIST, Jan. 21, 2006, at 53.
101 U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, REENTRY TRENDS IN THE U.S.: RECIDIVISM (2002), available at
http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/reentry/recidivism.htm; see also Fry-Bowers, supra note 58, at
909. The DOJ has not submitted a twenty-year study of recidivism rates for other criminals
to compare with those it compiled for sex offenders.
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from vehicles were rearrested for any offense within two years, and only
17% of child sex offenders were rearrested for any offense.'02
Altogether, although sex offenders do pose some risk as a group, less
than half are likely to ever re-offend, even over a two-decade span, and
government studies have found that less than one in twenty will harm a
child again in the three years after the offender is first released from prison.
Even the New Hampshire legislator who chaired the state legislature's
Committee on Criminal Justice and Public Safety conceded that only one in
thirty sex offenders are predators about whom society should be
concerned. 10 3  Further, any claims that sex offenders have a higher
recidivism rate over any period as compared to other felons appear
unfounded. 10 4 Only 39% of sex offenders were arrested for another crime
within three years, 10 5 compared to other felons, whose arrest rate for all
crimes approached 70%. 106 Some critics have responded by arguing that
stated sex offender recidivism rates are artificially low because sex crimes
are underreported, especially within families, 10 7 but the level of
underreporting would have to be quite high for sex crimes to make up the
current gap between sex offenders and other criminals. Furthermore,
underreporting of sex crimes committed within families would not support
residency restrictions, which are premised on keeping stranger sex
offenders away from unsuspecting children. While these lower recidivism
rates do not support the conclusion that sex offenders should not be
supervised at all, they do call into question any court'0 8 or expert'0 9 who
102 The end of innocence, supra note 100, at 53.
103 Mark Hayward, Who's more dangerous?, UNION LEADER (Manchester, N.H.), June 5,
2006, at Al.
104 See Karol Lucken & Jessica Latina, Sex Offender Civil Commitment Laws:
Medicalizing Deviant Sexual Behavior, 3 BARRY L. REv. 15 (2002). Lucken and Latina,
scholars skeptical of the harsh new sex offender laws, gave an example of the recidivism rate
fallacy. A State of Washington study concluded that sex offenders have an abnormally high
rate of recidivism, even though the state's own data on recidivism found a 48% rate among
sex offenders, but a rate of 52% for rapists, 48% for murders and 66% for robbers. Id. at 28.
This led Lucken and Latina to conclude: "Clearly, this is an illusory benchmark because if
the justification for commitment is based upon a high rate of recidivism, statistics clearly
favor targeting robbers under such specialized legislation. No such approach has been
taken." Id. at 28.
105 LANGAN, SCHMITT & DUROSE, supra note 82, at 35.
106 REENTRY TRENDS IN THE U.S.: RECIDIVISM, supra note 101.
107 La Fond & Winick, supra note 77, at 1180-81; see discussion infra notes 315-316 and
accompanying text (analyzing the methodology and possible motives behind these
underreporting claims).
108 See, e.g., Doe v. Miller, 405 F.3d 700, 707-08, 714-16 (8th Cir. 2005), cert. denied,
126 S. Ct. 757 (2005).
109 See, e.g., La Fond & Winick supra note 77, at 1180-81 (The authors acknowledge
[Vol. 97
NEVER GOING HOME
rationalizes residency restriction laws because sex offenders re-offend at
higher rates than other criminals.
B. THE PUBLIC FISCAL BURDEN OF RESIDENCY RESTRICTIONS
The second concern is the fiscal burden that residency restrictions
place on state and local governments. Wisconsin considered enacting a
residency restriction law, but concluded it would have cost at least $17
million to create sufficient housing for displaced sex offenders in rural areas
outside restricted zones. 110 Illinois's shorter five hundred foot restriction
will cause less problems than Iowa's two thousand foot restriction, where
studies have shown that entire communities are off limits to sex
offenders.' 11  However, the possibility remains even in Illinois that a
displaced offender could present a compelling case that in an area near
where he once lived, there is no possible alternative housing, and thus the
state should have to provide it. The state would then be required to build
public sex offender housing, an unenviable political task. The potential for
embarrassment and public ire alone should give legislators pause when
considering these laws.
C. THE REAL ESTATE CRISIS FOR LOW-INCOME COMMUNITIES
Residency restriction laws have led to two real estate crises. The first
crisis has developed in the areas in which sex offenders can legally live
because there are no prohibited facilities nearby. On the private sector side,
real estate developers are concerned that once the public learns which areas
are open to sex offenders, the housing values in those still-unrestricted areas
will plummet.' 12  A study of home values in Montgomery County, Ohio
confirmed this fear, finding that those homes located in close proximity to
the residence of a known sex offender decreased in value by up to 17%.'13
Residents of those neighborhoods open to sex offenders end up
bearing the true cost of residency restrictions as their neighborhoods
that the studies show the recidivism rates are "relatively low," but then contend that research
has "serious limitations" because sex crimes are underreported, and sex offenders will plead
out to lesser, non-sex-related charges); McKinney, supra note 19, at 318 (stating that sex
offenders should be treated differently because they have a "high recidivism rate" and
"mental abnormality" that means they are different from other criminals).
110 Duster, supra note 34, at 719.
... See Miller, 405 F.3d at 706; id. at 724 (Melloy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part). That was even before Iowa counties and communities added pools, libraries, parks,
and recreation trails to the list, further limiting the housing opportunities available to sex
offenders. See McCurdy, supra note 46, at 361.
112 Duster, supra note 34, at 773.
113 Henderson, supra note 29, at 839.
2006]
CALEB DURLING
become the dumping ground for society's pariahs. Already in Illinois, sex
offenders are massing in the 60628 zip code on the Far South Side of
Chicago. 1 4  This poor, primarily black area now houses more than one
tenth of the state's paroled offenders, who often live in boarding houses that
are willing to accommodate them in large numbers.' 15 The ACLU thus
concluded, "while 'herding former offenders into penal colonies may help
get politicians re-elected,... it is a poor use of law enforcement dollars.
The unfortunate families who happen to live in the few areas where these
former offenders can live aren't too thrilled about it either.'116
D. THE REAL ESTATE CRISIS FOR POOR SEX OFFENDERS
Low-income sex offenders face a severe housing problem when they
are released from prison because residency restrictions can dramatically
limit where an offender can live. Since schools, day care centers, and parks
are most often built in the center or main residential areas of cities and
towns, residency restrictions prevent offenders from living in the areas
closest to jobs and public transit. 1 7 In rural areas with small, compact
towns, a residency restriction can mean that an entire town is off limits,
leaving only distant farmhouses as possible options where a sex offender
can live. 18 For example, an Iowa sex offender was found living with his
family of three in a car on an abandoned farm property because residences
in the small farm towns were either off limits or too expensive.'9
Whenever an area does become the newest dumping ground for
offenders, the reaction among those living there has been to push sex
offenders out. In Chicago, the local alderman for the Far South Side
neighborhood that currently houses a tenth of the state's paroled sex
114 Residents Worry Sex Offenders Concentrated on South Side: Aldermen Promise to
Spread Out Housing for Offenders, NBC5/WMAQ-TV, Jan. 31, 2005,
http://www.nbc5.com/news/4148816/detail.html [hereinafter Concentrated on the South
Side].
115 Id.
1 6 Duster, supra note 34, at 772 (quoting Press Release, American Civil Liberties Union,
ACLU of Iowa Files First Ever Class-Action Lawsuit Challenging Sex Offender
"Banishment" (June 25, 2003), available at http://www.aclu.org/CriminalJustice/
CriminalJustice.cfn?ID= 13074&c= 15).
117 See id. at 715.
118 See Doe v. Miller, 405 F.3d 700, 706 (8th Cir. 2005), cert. denied, 126 S. Ct. 757
(2005); id. at 724 (Melloy, J., dissenting in part and concurring in part); Duster, supra note
34, at 715; Bluestein, supra note 46, at A3 (discussing a Georgia class action suit contending
that the state's residency restrictions drove sex offenders from the city and suburbs to trailers
in rural areas).
119 State v. Seering, 701 N.W.2d 655, 660 (Iowa 2005). The court noted Seering was
then ejected from the farm property. Id. at 660.
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offenders lobbied the city to pass an ordinance preventing multiple sex
offenders from living in the same building, effectively ending the boarding
house practice in place now.120  Federal law already bans sex offenders
from living in federal public housing, and a court in the State of
Washington allowed a private low-income landlord to expel a sex offender
tenant even though the offender had both disclosed his conviction from the
beginning and been a compliant tenant for six years. Further, since the
Archdiocesan Housing Authority had the district court's ruling confirmed
on appeal, the evicted tenant had to reimburse the authority for its
attorney's fees.122 The court conceded, "[W]e recognize that the Housing
Authority's rule is harsh as applied to Demmings, and regret that he must
suffer adverse consequences. Indeed, the rule is harsh as to all sex
offenders, who increasingly struggle to find housing upon their release.
The rule is, however, reasonable."'
' 23
These "reasonable" residency restrictions most harshly affect low-
income offenders, who return to society ostracized and without resources,
such as a car, after spending several years in prison. 124 As these isolated
offenders live far from work opportunities and without the means to get
there, scholars have concluded that they become even more marginalized
and less integrated into society.125 New Hampshire's chief parole and
probation officer concluded that sex offenders readjust to society better
when they have access to "employment, family support, social interaction,
church attendance and meetings with recovery groups, such as Alcoholics
,,126Anonymous. As a result, the residency restrictions meant to protect the
community may instead lead to banished sex offenders coming to believe
"their essential identity is as a sex offender," which then "stimulate[s] re-
offense."
127
Thus the residency restrictions suffer from several practical problems
that call into question their basis, efficacy, and fairness. Their scientific
premise is spurious and only leads to overinclusive and ineffective
120 Concentrated on the South Side, supra note 114.
121 See Archdiocesan Hous. Auth. v. Demmings, No. 46157-51, 2001 WL 1229809, at *2
(Wash. Ct. App., Oct 15, 2001).
122 Id.
123 Id.
124 Duster, supra note 34, at 715. One article detailed how difficult it is even for
educated and formerly well-paid individuals who are convicted sex offenders to find work
after release from prison. Mark Hayward, Jobs hard tofind, tougher to keep, UNION LEADER
(Manchester, N.H.), June 4, 2006, at A10.
125 Duster, supra note 34, at 715.
126 Hayward, supra note 59, at Al.
127 Henderson, supra note 29, at 804-05.
2006]
CALEB DURLING
restrictions that will do nothing to stop the small fraction of sex offenders
who will harm unknown children again. Instead, the residency restrictions
limit the opportunities available to all sex offenders, many of whom are
quite poor, as they attempt to reintegrate into society. Further, residency
restrictions could become costly and politically unpopular if a state were
forced to provide or even build banished sex offender housing. Lastly,
those areas outside of the prohibited zones where sex offenders can live are
shouldering the burden for the rest of society, and soon enough these
communities too will act to avoid the stigma and plummeting housing
values that follow sex offenders.
IV. CONSTITUTIONAL CHALLENGES TO RESIDENCY RESTRICTION LAWS
The United States Supreme Court has not yet taken a case that
considers the constitutionality of residency restrictions, having recently
denied certiorari on the Eighth Circuit decision Doe v. Miller.12 8 The Court
has held SORAs constitutional in the 2003 decision of Smith v. Doe.
129
However, the majority in Smith included dicta that sex offenders could use
to distinguish residency restrictions from SORAs130 and then successfully
challenge residency restrictions as unconstitutional for violating the ex post
facto prohibition in the Constitution.13 1 Section IV, after summarizing
Smith, will analyze residency restrictions under the five factors of the
Mendoza-Martinez ex post facto test,' 32 applying the facts and arguments of
the principal cases to date that have challenged residency restrictions in
state 133 and federal court.
13 4
Besides People v. Leroy in the Illinois state courts, offenders in
Arkansas, Ohio, Iowa, Georgia, and Alabama have all challenged the
constitutionality of residency restrictions. The Eighth Circuit recently
upheld Arkansas's residency restriction for offenders assessed as high-
128 See Doe v. Miller, 405 F.3d 700 (8th Cir. 2005), cert. denied, 126 S. Ct. 757 (2005).
129 538 U.S. 84 (2003).
130 See id. at 100.
131 U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 10, cl. 1.
132 United States v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 168-69 (1963).
133 See, e.g., Lee v. State, 895 So. 2d 1038 (Ala. 2004); Mann v. State, 603 S.E.2d 283
(Ga. 2004); People v. Leroy, 828 N.E.2d 769 (Ill. App. Ct. 2005), appeal denied, 839 N.E.2d
1032 (I11. 2005); State v. Seering, 701 N.W.2d 655 (Iowa 2005).
134 See, e.g., Weems v. Little Rock Police Dep't, 453 F.3d 1010 (8th Cir. 2006); Doe v.
Miller, 405 F.3d 700 (8th Cir. 2005), cert. denied, 126 S. Ct. 757 (2005); Doe v. Baker, No.
Civ. A. 1:05-CV-2265, 2006 WL 905368 (N.D. Ga. Apr. 5, 2006); Coston v. Petro, 398 F.
Supp. 2d 878 (N.D. Ohio 2005); Doe v. Miller, 298 F. Supp. 2d 844 (S.D. Iowa 2004), rev'd,
405 F.3d 700 (8th Cir. 2005), cert denied, 126 S. Ct. 757 (2005).
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risk.135 Federal district courts in Ohio 136 and Georgia 37 have also recently
upheld those states' residency restrictions. There are two cases from Iowa
challenging that state's residency restrictions: State v. Seering, an Iowa
Supreme Court case upholding the state's residency restriction over two
dissenting votes; 38 and Doe v. Miller, an Eighth Circuit opinion upholding
the Iowa residency restriction by a two-to-one vote and reversing the
district court judge who had ruled in favor of the plaintiff class of sex
offenders. 139 The supreme courts of Alabama 140 and Georgia' 4' have both
upheld residency restrictions in brief opinions that quickly dismissed the
constitutional arguments raised by the offenders.
A. SMITH V DOE
The most significant Supreme Court case regarding sex offender
restrictions is Smith v. Doe, which upheld Alaska's SORA provisions. 142 In
Smith, both respondent sex offenders had been convicted and served their
prison sentences long before Alaska passed its SORA, so they argued that
the SORA was a punitive provision applied retroactively to them, thus
violating the ex post facto prohibition contained in Article 1, Section 10 of
the United States Constitution. 43 The Supreme Court subjected the SORA
to the five factors of the ex post facto analysis that it outlined in United
States v. Mendoza-Martinez,144 and concluded that the SORA was civil and
nonpunitive, and thus did not violate the ex post facto prohibition. 45 In the
six-to-three opinion, 146 the Court held that Alaska had the right to require
135 Weems, 453 F.3d at 1012-13, 1017. See discussion infra Section V.A (discussing
why Arkansas's law is probably the most effective of the current residency restrictions and
stands on the strongest constitutional footing, because it is premised on a showing of high
risk on an assessment criteria).
136 Coston, 398 F. Supp. 2d 878 (Ohio).
117 Baker, 2006 WL 905368 (Georgia).
38 Seering, 701 N.W.2d 655.
"9 Miller, 405 F.3d 700; Miller, 298 F. Supp. 2d 844.
140 Lee v. State, 895 So. 2d 1038 (Ala. 2004); see also In re J.L.N. v. State, 894 So. 2d
751 (Ala. 2004).
141 Mann v. State, 603 S.E.2d 283 (Ga. 2004).
142 Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84, 105 (2003). This case was decided in companion with
Connecticut Department of Public Safety v. Doe, 538 U.S. 1 (2003), a similar challenge of
Connecticut's SORA provisions, but a decision which did not include the same depth of ex
post facto analysis as Smith.
141 Smith, 538 U.S. at 91-92.
'44 372 U.S. 144, 168-69 (1963).
141 Smith, 538 U.S. at 92-105.
146 Justice Souter concurred in the judgment, upholding the law only because of the
legislative presumption of constitutionality, id. at 109-10 (Souter, J., concurring in
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registration since the offenders posed a substantial risk of re-offending,
noting that the Court had previously concluded that sex offenders are
"much more likely than other type[s] of offender[s] to be arrested for a new
rape or sexual assault." 147 The Court then rationalized upholding Alaska's
law by stating it was "conjecture" and that there was "no evidence" that the
SORA led to "substantial occupational or housing disadvantages for former
sex offenders that would not have otherwise occurred through the use of
routine background checks by employers and landlords.,
148
B. EX POST FACTO ANALYSIS
Residency restrictions come under ex post facto scrutiny because they,
like all other post-conviction and parole sex offender risk management
laws, purport to be civil and not criminal in nature. 149 The ex post facto
clause of Article 1, Section 10 of the Constitution prohibits a law from
imposing additional punishment for a sentenced crime after the initial
sentence has been handed down. 150  If a law does impose an additional
punishment on the person, then the law is punitive and an impermissible ex
post facto law.15 1
The Supreme Court has developed a two-step test to determine if a law
is civil or punitive.' 52 First, a court faced with an ex post facto challenge
will examine the stated legislative intent of the statute. 153 With residency
restrictions, all reviewing courts have concluded that the legislative intent
was civil, not punitive, citing the legislative record stating that the
restrictions are intended to protect society and children from sex offenders,
rather than to punish sex offenders.
54
A court will then progress to the second step of examining whether,
despite the law's stated civil intent, the law's effects are nonetheless so
punitive that they negate its stated intent.155 The Supreme Court, in United
judgment), hardly a ringing endorsement of SORAs' constitutionality and an indication of
his willingness to scrutinize other sex offender restrictions in future cases. Justices Stevens,
Breyer, and Ginsburg dissented. Id. at 110-18 (Stevens, Ginsburg, Breyer, JJ., dissenting).
141 Id. at 103.
141 Id. at 100.
149 See, e.g., id. at 93; Doe v. Miller, 405 F.3d 700, 705 (8th Cir. 2005), cert denied, 126
S. Ct. 757 (2005); People v. Leroy, 828 N.E.2d 769, 779 (Il1. App. Ct. 2005), appeal denied,
839 N.E.2d 1032 (I1. 2005).
150 U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 10, cl. 1.
' Smith, 538 U.S. at 92.
152 Id.; United States v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 168-69 (1963).
153 Smith, 538 U.S. at 92.
154 See, e.g., Leroy, 828 N.E.2d at 775.
155 See, e.g., Smith, 538 U.S. at 92.
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States v. Mendoza-Martinez,156 created a list of seven "guideposts" for a
court when considering this question, five of which the Smith court
concluded were relevant to an analysis of sex offender risk management
laws: (1) Is the restriction historically regarded as a punishment? (2) Does
the restriction impose an affirmative disability or restraint? (3) Does the
restriction promote the traditional aims of punishment (i.e., retribution and
deterrence)? (4) Does the restriction have a rational connection to a
nonpunitive purpose? (5) Is the restriction excessive with respect to its
purpose? 157 The Supreme Court has not stated how to weigh these five
factors 158 or whether a law is categorically unconstitutional after failing a
certain number of the factors, leaving lower courts able to weigh and
discount factors as they see fit.'
59
1. Is the Penalty Historically Considered a Punishment1
60
The first Mendoza-Martinez factor considers whether or not the
penalty at issue has been historically considered a punishment. 161 The
historical punishment similar to residency restrictions is banishment, which
American colonists used to eject those who would not comply with a
community's norms or rules. 62  Residency conditions placed on sex
offenders and other paroled criminals that have been found to constitute
banishment have been ruled unconstitutional. 63
Courts have resorted to several arguments to avoid answering the
question of whether residency restrictions are actually banishment. The
156 372 U.S. at 168-69.
... Smith, 538 U.S. at 97.
158 Id. (describing the factors as "neither exhaustive nor dispositive," but merely "useful
guideposts").
159 See, e.g., Doe v. Miller, 405 F.3d 700, 721 (8th Cir. 2005), cert denied, 126 S. Ct. 757
(2005); Leroy, 828 N.E.2d at 781.
160 Smith, 538 U.S. at 97.
161 Id.
162 Leroy, 828 N.E.2d at 780.
163 State v. Beach, 147 Cal. App. 3d 612, 620-21 (Cal. Ct. App. 1983) (holding it
unconstitutional for a court to include as part of probation conditions that an elderly woman
charged with involuntary manslaughter be forced to move from her home of twenty-four
years and move to another neighborhood for the five-year duration of the probation). See
also Booth v. State, where an Alaska appellate court judge twice reversed the sentence given
to a sex offender by a district court when the terms of probation would have forbidden the
offender from living in the same village as his victim for thirty-six months. No. A-8219,
2002 WL 31307875, at *1-2 (Alaska Ct. App. Oct. 16, 2002). The probation had been
ordered since the village was too small and had no police officer to supervise the defendant.
Id. at *1-2. The appellate court concluded this was unconstitutional banishment, as the
defendant had lived there his whole life. Id. at *2.
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Leroy court noted that the offender could always find somewhere else to
live. 164  Several courts have concluded the restrictions did not constitute
banishment as in colonial days, since the offender could enter the restricted
zone to visit or conduct business, although he could never again stay the
night. 165 Other courts avoided the banishment issue procedurally by saying
that the sex offender did not allege sufficient facts at trial to show that he
was rendered homeless. 166 The Alabama Supreme Court further concluded
that there was no evidence that anyone had ever been banished from one's
home as a result of the state's residency restriction.
67
Instead, quite the opposite is true: the only way residency restrictions
would work, in the eyes of the public and legislators, is if the law did root
out those sex offenders living near schools, parks, and child care facilities
and prevent others from moving into the restricted zones.
Observers and dissenting judges who have concluded that residency
restrictions constitute banishment offer ample support for their contention.
Miller provided the strongest empirical proof of actual banishment caused
by the restrictions, as the plaintiff sex offenders produced studies showing
that several Iowa counties, 168 cities, 169 and small towns were essentially
164 Leroy, 828 N.E.2d at 780.
165 See Doe v. Baker, No. Civ. A. 1:05-CV-2265, 2006 WL 905368, at *3 (N.D. Ga. Apr.
5, 2006); Coston v. Petro, 398 F. Supp. 2d 878, 885 (N.D. Ohio 2005); Mann v. State, 603
S.E.2d 283, 285-86 & n.7 (Ga. 2004). But see Baker, 2006 WL 905368 at *4, which upheld
Georgia's one thousand foot restriction in a suburban area as constitutional, but conceded
that "[a] more restrictive act that would in effect make it impossible for a registered sex
offender to live in the community would in all likelihood constitute banishment which would
result in an ex post facto problem if applied retroactively to those convicted prior to its
passage."
166 See, e.g., Lee v. State, 895 So. 2d 1038, 1043 (Ala. 2004). Residency restrictions can
lead to emotionally and fiscally harsh decisions for affected sex offenders with families.
One Georgia sex offender had to purchase an additional residence outside restricted areas,
while his wife, daughter, son, and mother-in-law remained in the family residence within the
restricted zone. Baker, 2006 WL 905368, at * 1.
161 Id. at 1043 (holding there is "no evidence.., indicating that he or any other sex
offender was homeless, or that he or any other sex offender has been banished from his
home or his community").
168 In mostly rural Carroll County, Iowa, of the 9019 residential units available, just 2077
(23%) were outside the restricted areas, and of them, 1694 were distant farm houses while
only 244 were located in communities too small to have a school or child care facility. Doe
v. Miller, 405 F.3d 700, 706 n.2 (8th Cir. 2005), cert. denied, 126 S. Ct. 757 (2005).
Johnson County, where the University of Iowa is located, was "virtually" completely off-
limits to sex offenders as a result of the residency restrictions. Duster, supra note 34, at 723.
169 In Des Moines, sex offenders were left with an industrial area and some of the city's
newest and wealthiest neighborhoods available for them to live. Miller, 405 F.3d at 724
(Melloy, J., dissenting in part and concurring in part). In Bettendorf, sex offenders could
live on a golf course or in a few wealthy neighborhoods. Duster, supra note 34, at 723.
[Vol. 97
NEVER GOING HOME
inaccessible. 170  The dissenting Eighth Circuit judge in Miller thus
concluded that residency restrictions were tantamount to banishment: "The
difficulty in finding proper housing prevents offenders from living in many
Iowa communities. This effectively results in banishment from virtually all
of Iowa's cities and towns." 17' The dissenting judge in Leroy considered
Illinois's residency restriction a "substantial" limitation on where Leroy
could live in his hometown of East St. Louis, concluding that "to
indefinitely expel a man from his family home, and separate him from
family members with whom he has lived his entire life, seems decidedly
similar to a method of punishment employed in colonial times."'' 72 The two
dissenting judges on the Iowa Supreme Court in Seering also found that
Iowa's residency restriction law constituted banishment for its detrimental
social effect on the released sex offender, as it "imposes an onerous and
intrusive obligation on a convicted sex offender, results in community
ostracism, and marks the offender as a person who should be shunned by
society."'
' 73
Lastly, the language of the Smith decision affirming the SORAs should
not extend to upholding residency restrictions. In Smith, the Court decided
the SORAs did not constitute banishment because the practice in colonial
times involved "face to face shaming" and expulsion, whereas the SORAs
resulted in social condemnation through correct information. 174 The Court
then approved of the SORAs partly because the measures placed no limit on
where a sex offender could live.175 As Judge Melloy noted in his dissent in
Miller, the Supreme Court could not use the same reasoning to uphold
residency restrictions, for restrictions do involve expulsion and place limits
on where an offender can live.
176
Studies of residency restrictions enacted elsewhere confirm this. The Seattle suburb
Issaquah, which limited offenders to commercial and industrial zones within the city that
were also at least 1000 feet from schools and day care centers, resulted in only 250 to 300 of
the city's 7000 units being legally available to sex offenders, thus rendering 95% of the
community's housing off-limits. See MacLean, supra note 46, at 6.
170 Miller, 405 F.3d at 724 (Melloy, J., dissenting in part and concurring in part); Duster,
supra note 34, at 723.
171 Miller, 405 F.3d at 724 (Melloy, J., dissenting in part and concurring in part).
172 People v. Leroy, 828 N.E.2d 769, 787, 789 (Il. App. Ct. 2005), appeal denied, 839
N.E.2d 1032 (Ill. 2005) (Kuehn, J., dissenting).
173 State v. Seering, 701 N.W.2d 655, 671-72 (Wiggins, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part).
174 Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84, 98 (2003).
175 Id. at 100.
176 Miller, 405 F.3d at 724 (Melloy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (after
describing the holding in Smith, concluding the Iowa law "fits the description of
banishment"); see also Brett Hobson, Note, Banishing Acts: How Far May States Go to
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2. Does the Restriction Impose an Affirmative Disability or Restraint?
177
The courts that upheld residency restrictions in Leroy, Seering, and
Miller conceded that the law violates the second ex post facto guidepost of
imposing an affirmative disability or restraint. 178 As noted above, the law
would not work unless it prevented sex offenders from living in certain
places. However, the Leroy majority downplayed the importance of this
guidepost, terming it insufficient to render residency restrictions punitive.
79
Dissenting judges that have criticized residency restrictions have not
brushed off this factor so quickly. First, the factor differentiates SORAs
from residency restrictions, since the former do not place a limit on where
sex offenders can live and thus work, but the latter's aim is exactly that
limitation. This differentiation matters since it indicates the Court's
reasoning in Smith for upholding the SORAs180 does not provide a strong
basis for also upholding residency restrictions. Indeed, the SORA in Smith
passed this second factor as well as the previous one examining
banishment. On the other hand, the federal district court in Miller, which
held Iowa's residency restrictions unconstitutional, found that the residency
restriction "impose[d] exactly the affirmative restraint that the Supreme
Court [in Smith] found lacking in Alaska's sex offender registration
schemes."' 8 1 The dissenter in Miller's Eighth Circuit decision agreed, as he
was concerned that residency restrictions went "far beyond" mere
registration, becoming the type of law that Smith implied would be
illegal. 182  Thus, residency restrictions clearly impose an affirmative
restraint, although what weight this factor should carry in the overall
consideration of ex post facto analysis remains unclear.
3. Does the Restriction Promote the Traditional Aims of Punishment?
183
If residency restrictions are civil, then they should not promote the
traditional aims of punishment-retribution and deterrence.' 84 Courts have
Keep Convicted Sex Offenders Away from Children?, 40 GA. L. REv. 961, 990-91 (2006)
(criticizing courts for relying on Smith to conclude residency restrictions are not punitive in
effect since there are "significant differences" in "the magnitude of the burden" between
registration requirements and residency restrictions).
177 Smith, 538 U.S. at 97.
178 See Miller, 405 F.3d at 720-21; People v. Leroy, 828 N.E.2d 769, 781 (Il. App. Ct.
2005), appeal denied, 839 N.E.2d 1032 (Ill. 2005); Seering, 701 N.W.2d at 668.
179 See Leroy, 828 N.E.2d at 781.
"S0 Smith, 538 U.S. at 100.
181 Doe v. Miller, 298 F. Supp. 2d 844, 870 (S.D. Iowa 2004), rev'd, 405 F.3d 700 (8th
Cir. 2005), cert denied, 126 S. Ct. 757 (2005).
182 See Miller, 405 F.3d at 725 (Melloy, J., dissenting in part and concurring in part).
183 Smith, 538 U.S. at 97.
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offered two reasons why sex offender management laws in general do not
promote retribution and deterrence. First, in Smith, the United States
Supreme Court concluded that Alaska's SORA was not retributive since the
law was reasonably related to sex offenders having unusually high rates of
recidivism, although the Court cited to no particular data when making this
assertion. 85 Rather, the statistical evidence compiled by private and public
sources and summarized in Section III.A show that sex offenders are in fact
far less likely to re-offend than other felons and cast doubt on Smith's
assertions to the contrary.1 86  Second, the Leroy court accepted that
Illinois's residency restrictions might be deterrent, but found the law still
acceptable since many government initiatives deter without being
considered punishments, and residency restrictions do not "significantly"
promote deterrence. 1
87
Judge Kuehn, dissenting in Leroy, considered Illinois's residency
restrictions to be deterrent and highly retributive.1 88 Judge Kuehn noted the
ironic consolation offered by the majority that Leroy could visit his mother
at her home, every day if he wished, so long as he did not sleep there at
night. 189 As a result of these permissible visits, Leroy could be at his
mother's home during the day-when school was in session and he
allegedly posed a risk to children-but could not spend the night at the
house when the school children would have all returned to their homes.
Judge Kuehn concluded this result could only be considered retributive:
Absent a tendency to promote retribution, what legitimate purpose would legislators
have in removing Patrick Leroy from his home, given the fact that he has lived there
for 10 years without re-offending, despite his close proximity to the hundreds upon
hundreds of children who have matriculated to Miles Davis Elementary School during
the same time span?
190
184 Id.
185 Id. at 102.
186 See discussion supra Section III.A (examining recidivism statistics for sexual
offenders compared to other felons).
187 People v. Leroy, 828 N.E.2d 769, 781 (Il1. App. Ct. 2005), appeal denied, 839 N.E.2d
1032 (Ill. 2005); see also Doe v. Baker, No. Civ. A. 1:05-CV-2265, 2006 WL 905368 at *1
(N.D. Ga. Apr. 5, 2006); Coston v. Petro, 398 F. Supp. 2d 878, 885 (N.D. Ohio 2005); Mann
v. State, 603 S.E.2d 283, 285-86 & n.7 (Ga. 2004). In Mann, the Georgia Supreme Court
rationalized that "the Statute does not prohibit appellant from visiting his parent's property,
conducting a business on the property, or even purchasing and leasing the property-it only
prohibits his residency on the property," thus leading the court to conclude, "in contrast to
these slight considerations, the State's interests underlying the Residency Statute are
considerable." 603 S.E.2d at 285-86 & n.7.
188 Leroy, 828 N.E.2d at 791 (Kuehn, J., dissenting).
189 Id. (Kuehn, J., dissenting).
190 Id. (Kuehn, J., dissenting).
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Judge Kuehn further criticized the uniform application of these residency
restrictions, which fail to consider sex offenders' prior offenses or case
histories, leading him to conclude that the law was only meant to punish the
offender and not protect the community: "Since this Act treats all offenders
alike, without consideration of whether a particular offender is likely to
reoffend, its retroactive residency restriction promotes and furthers
retribution, a traditional aim of punishment."' 9'
4. Does the Restriction Have a Rational Connection to a Nonpunitive
Purpose?1
92
Residency restrictions have a rational connection to a nonpunitive
purpose, as they are designed to keep children safe from sexual assault by
known offenders. 93 Despite the statistics in Section III.A that show the far
lower recidivism rate of child sex offenders compared to other released
felons, 194 this nonpunitive purpose still has merit. The question, again, is
how much weight should be accorded to this factor as compared to the other
four factors, a matter on which the Supreme Court has given no guidance.' 95
The Eighth Circuit in Miller announced that this guidepost was the "most
significant factor" and that it trumped the previous factors which the
residency restriction had violated, but cited no authority for this
conclusion. 96  Hopefully, a future Supreme Court case will decide the
relative weight of these ex post facto factors or more strongly insist on
equal consideration of all the factors to halt this judicial fiddling.
5. Is the Restriction Excessive with Respect to its PurposeY
97
The fifth factor turns on the empirical issue of how often sex offenders
re-offend, and hence the legitimacy of laws restricting the areas in which
they can live. The Smith Court concluded that sex offenders had a high rate
of recidivism, specifically noting a report issued by the DOJ showing that
sex offenders could do nothing for twenty years and then harm children
19' Id. (Kuehn, J., dissenting).
192 Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84, 97 (2003).
193 Leroy, 828 N.E.2d at 781-82.
194 See discussion supra Section III.A.
195 Smith, 538 U.S. at 97 (describing the factors as "neither exhaustive nor dispositive,"
but merely "useful guideposts").
196 Doe v. Miller, 405 F.3d 700, 721 (8th Cir. 2005), cert denied, 126 S. Ct. 757 (2005)
(quoting Smith, 538 U.S. at 102). The Miller court engaged in a little judicial dishonesty
with this claim (or were just guilty of an editing oversight), as the Smith court characterized
it as a most significant factor, rather than the most significant factor. Compare id. at 721,
with Smith, 538 U.S. at 102.
' Smith, 538 U.S. at 97.
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again. 198 The Court cited to the report to justify a registration system to
keep track of dormant but still potentially dangerous offenders. 199 In Miller,
the Eighth Circuit endorsed the testimony of a state expert who testified that
there were "very high rates of re-offense" by sex offenders who target
children, and rejected the testimony of the plaintiffs' expert of the who
testified that sex offenders had an average recidivism rate of 20-25%.200
Section III.A detailed the statistics produced by the DOJ and academics
which refute these courts' beliefs in sex offenders' abnormally high
recidivism rates.20  Nevertheless, courts have deferred to legislative
judgment, noting that it is not the job of the courts to determine if sex
offender management laws are drafted in the best possible way, so long as
the laws are a reasonable way of achieving the ends of preventing sex
offender recidivism.
20 2
Judges critical of sex offender management laws have expressed great
concern with the overinclusivity of these restrictions. Justice Souter,
concurring only in the judgment in Smith, questioned whether "the fact that
the [SORA] uses past crime as the touchstone, probably sweeping in a
significant number of people who pose no real threat to the community,
serves to feed suspicion that something more than regulation of safety is
going on. 203  Justice Ginsburg, dissenting in Smith, criticized the
overinclusivity of Alaska's SORA law as "[excessive] in relation to its
nonpunitive purpose." She pointed out the inconsistency of the alleged
purpose of the Act-to prevent recidivism-with one of the respondents'
situation, as the Alaska courts had twice noted his successful rehabilitation
and had even granted him custody of a child of the same age and gender as
his previous victim.20 4 Justice Ginsburg noted this incongruity in warning
about the potentially punitive effect of overinclusive sex offender
registration laws.20 5 Put another way by one scholar:
198 Id. at 103-04 (quoting R. Prentky, R. Knight & A. Lee, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Nat'l
Inst. of Justice, Child Sexual Molestation: Research Issues 14 (1997)).
199 Id. (quoting PRENTKY, KNIGHT & LEE, supra note 198, at 14).
200 Miller, 405 F.3d at 707, 722.
201 See discussion supra Section III.A.
202 See, e.g., Smith, 538 U.S. at 103, 105; People v. Leroy, 828 N.E.2d 769, 782 (111. App.
Ct. 2005), appeal denied, 839 N.E.2d 1032 (II1. 2005).
203 Smith, 538 U.S. at 109 (Souter, J., concurring in judgment)
204 Id. at 117-18 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
205 Id. (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) ("Notwithstanding this strong evidence of rehabilitation
[being granted custody and being released from jail early], the Alaska Act requires Doe to
report personal information to the State four times per year, and permits the State publicly to
label him a 'Registered Sex Offender' for the rest of this life.").
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By allowing these individuals to return to the community following their punishment,
whether or not they are subject to probation or parole, [the state] has tacitly agreed
they are safe enough. Infringement on their right to establish a home and maintain
familial relationships results in significant restrictions on their ability to reintegrate
into society and shocks one's sense of fair play.
20 6
Since residency restrictions apply for life, they evince a belief that sex
offenders will never be rehabilitated, leading the dissenting judge in Seering
to conclude that it "exceeds the non-punitive purpose of the statute. 2 °7
C. CONCLUSIONS ON RESIDENCY RESTRICTIONS
For the reasons stated above, serious questions remain regarding the
efficacy, basis, and constitutionality of residency restriction laws for
convicted sex offenders. Constitutionally, the residency restrictions violate
as many as four of the five applicable guideposts in the ex post facto
analysis, and as a scholar reiterated after analyzing the Iowa residency
restrictions, "there is no place in our Constitution for such an exception to
the prohibition of ex post facto laws. 20 8  Courts have thus far upheld
residency restrictions by downplaying the guideposts which the restrictions
clearly violate and emphasizing their rational relation to a nonpunitive
purpose, but a law's constitutionality should not depend on judicial sleight
of hand. Further, the reasoning in the United States Supreme Court's Smith
decision which upheld the SORAs' constitutionality does not convincingly
extend to upholding residency restrictions, as these latter measures
constitute banishment and impose real limitations on where sex offenders
can live and, by extension, work, rather than simply providing information
to the public as the former laws do.2 °9
Examining the law from scientific, social, and political viewpoints,
residency restrictions are no less troubling. The rationale of needing
enhanced policing measures because sex offenders have a higher rate of
recidivism than other felons is specious; in the first three years after release,
only 3% of sex offenders will harm children again whereas nearly 70% of
other violent criminals will be rearrested.210  While one can argue quite
persuasively that any further sexual offenses against children are
unacceptable, the claims of sex offenders' higher recidivism rates are
undermined by the overwhelming amount of research conducted on the
206 Fry-Bowers, supra note 58, at 922.
207 State v. Seering, 701 N.W.2d 655, 672 (Iowa 2005) (Wiggins, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part).
208 Duster, supra note 34, at 735; see also Hobson, supra note 176, at 991-92.
209 See Smith, 538 U.S. at 98-100.
210 See discussion supra notes 97-101 and accompanying text.
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topic that indicates otherwise. Second, residency restrictions may not deter
those rare offenders who do wish to harm children whom they don't know,
as even a one mile restriction would not have stopped those few offenders
in Minnesota who traveled several miles to parks to harm unknown
children.2 11 Lastly, the costs on both society and on offenders are
enormous. Offenders are overwhelmingly poor and lack the resources after
prison to become productive members of society, especially when they are
forced to live far from jobs and urban areas as social outcasts.
In the short term, these laws will likely continue to be upheld,
especially by state court judges facing re-election pressures.212 That said,
grave constitutional questions exist with uniformly-applied residency
restrictions, and dissenting judges are increasingly voicing cogent concerns
about these restrictions. A well-researched case, documenting on a large
scale that the residency restrictions prevented or essentially prevented sex
offenders from finding available housing, would force a court to either
strike down the residency restriction or clearly contradict the Court's
reasoning in Smith v. Doe for upholding SORAs.
V. BEST PRACTICE METHODS FOR MANAGING SEX OFFENDER RISK IN THE
COMMUNITY
Recognizing that residency restrictions are an inappropriate answer for
sex offender risk management, policymakers concerned with protecting
their community must consider new and different strategies. As befits our
federalist system, states are trying many different methods to prevent sex
offender recidivism, reforming not only the post-prison restrictions on sex
offenders, but also the type of courts that handle these cases and the
sentencing structure for sex offenders. This final section will consider four
methods that aim to manage sex offenders: (1) use of risk assessment
criteria to match post-prison restrictions to prior acts and future risk, (2)
indeterminate sentencing, (3) civil commitments, and (4) sex offender
211 Duster, supra note 34, at 753.
212 See Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 536 U.S. 765, 789 (2002) (O'Connor, J.,
concurring) (saying that elected judges "cannot help being aware that if the public is not
satisfied with the outcome of a particular case, it could hurt their reelection prospects").
Justice O'Connor continued by citing to a law review article quoting former California
Supreme Court Judge Otto Kaus that a judge claiming to be oblivious of the election
consequences when making a controversial decision is akin to "ignoring a crocodile in your
bathtub." Id. at 789 (quoting Julian Eule, Crocodiles in the Bathtub: State Courts, Voter
Initiatives and the Threat of Electoral Reprisal, 65 U. COLO. L. REV. 733, 739 (1994)); see
also MONROE H. FREEDMAN & ABBE SMITH, UNDERSTANDING LAWYERS' ETHICS 248 (3d ed.
2004) ("There is substantial reason to believe that elective judges are influenced in
controversial cases by the threat of being voted out of office.").
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reentry courts. Section V examines how each of these methods works in
practice before weighing their benefits and concerns. Section VI proposes a
comprehensive risk management system using a mix of methods that best
focuses a state's finite resources on those sex offenders who are identified
to pose the greatest risk, while allowing the many low-risk offenders who
are highly unlikely to re-offend to reintegrate into society with only
minimal restrictions placed on them.
A. BETTER-TAILORED RESTRICTIONS THROUGH RISK ASSESSMENT
CRITERIA
States should implement well-founded risk assessment criteria to
categorize sex offenders based on future risk and prior bad acts, and then
tailor restrictive measures accordingly. As discussed in Section III.A,
studies show that sex offenders do not re-offend at a higher rate than other
criminals; in fact, quite the opposite is true, as even the longest twenty-year
study shows that fewer than half of sex offenders will re-offend.21 3
Legislators would thus better protect the community by creating assessment
criteria to identify the sex offenders that pose the greatest risk of re-
offending. Prosecutors could then reasonably seek, and judges could
reasonably impose, longer prison sentences and more controlling post-
prison restrictions on those high-risk offenders.
Several states now use criteria for assessing the risk of sex offender
recidivism. Nebraska's assessment criteria, known as an instrument,
determines both the registration and level of custody requirements placed
on a sex offender upon release from prison,2 14 although it could easily be
modified to include determinations of residency restriction level or any
other risk management measure.21 5 State authorities created the instrument
in consultation with Mario Scalora, a professor of law and psychology at
the University of Nebraska, who tracked 1,300 sex offenders to determine
which factors most closely related to recidivism when the offender was
released into the community.216
213 See discussion supra Section III.A and accompanying text, concerning actual
recidivism statistics for sexual offenders as compared to other felons.
214 NEB. REV. STAT. § 29-4013 (2005); see Slansky v. Neb. State Patrol, 685 N.W.2d 335
(Neb. 2004).
215 Arkansas has done just that, as the state's residency restrictions are applied only to
those sex offenders demonstrating a high risk level on that state's assessment criteria. See
ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-14-128 (2005); Weems v. Little Rock Police Dep't, 453 F.3d 1010,
1012-13 (8th Cir. 2006).
216 Slansky, 685 N.W.2d at 342-43. The study had an error rate of 12%. Id. at 348.
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Nebraska's instrument focuses on the offender's past acts and his
psychiatric state upon release. 7 The offender is then assessed to be at a
risk level of either one (low), two (medium), or three (high)." The
instrument weighs the following factors in determining the offender's risk
level:
* Whether the conduct of the sex offender was characterized by repetitive and
compulsive behavior;
" Whether the sex offender committed the sexual offense against a child;
" Whether the sexual offense involved the use of a weapon, violence, or infliction of
serious bodily harm;
" The number, date, and nature of prior offenses;
" Whether psychological or psychiatric profiles indicate a risk of recidivism;
" The sex offender's response to treatment;
" Any recent threats by the sex offender against a person, or expressions of intent to
commit additional crimes; and
* Behavior of the sex offender while confined.
219
The presence of either of two additional factors automatically result in
an offender being assessed a level one (low) ranking: proof of advanced age
or debilitating illness.220 On the other hand, the presence of any one of four
other indicators results in an automatic level three (high) determination of
the sex offender's risk: "(1) Torture or mutilation of the victim or the
infliction of death, (2) abduction and forcible transportation of the victim to
another location, (3) threats to reoffend sexually or violently, and (4) recent
clinical assessment of dangerousness.
'221
The assessor then considers which conditions on release would
minimize the sex offender's risk of recidivism: probation, parole,
counseling, therapy, or treatment. 222 For those offenders released into the
public, the assessment level affects who in the public is alerted to the
offender's status and presence in the community.2 23  If an offender is
determined to be level one, only law enforcement officials are notified of
217 Id. at 342.
211 Id. at 341.




223 Id. at 341.
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his location.224 If level two, then nearby schools, daycare centers, and
religious and youth organizations are also notified of the offender's
identity.225 If level three, all members of the public who might encounter
the individual are notified. 26
Risk assessment criteria have several advantages. First, assessment
criteria can ensure a better allocation of state resources. The state can
imprison or harshly restrict the high risk offenders, while enabling low and
moderate risk sex offenders to live in the community with appropriate
restrictions and undergo mandatory outpatient treatment. The latter option
is significantly cheaper than incarceration.227
Second, risk assessment criteria allow courts to impose future
restrictions in proportion to an offender's prior acts. Judges 228 and
scholars 229 critical of the uniformly-applied residency restrictions have
urged this type of nuanced, individually tailored approach. In Leroy, Judge
Kuehn criticized the disconnect between risk and punishment caused by
uniformly-applied residency restrictions:
[A] man branded a child sex offender for having had consensual sex with a 17-year-
old girl could safely reside in close proximity to toddlers gathered at a daycare center
but present a problem living across the street from a high school. On the other hand, a
pedophile grandfather, branded a child sex offender for fondling his young
grandchildren and their friends, presents a potential problem living across the street
from a daycare center but could safely reside in close proximity to a high school.
224 id.
225 Id.
226 Id. New Jersey uses a similar three-tier system, in which only police know of low-
risk offenders, schools are alerted about medium-risk offenders, and the police notify anyone
in the "public that [is] likely to come in contact with" with high-risk offenders. See Debra
H. Goldstein & Stephanie Goldstein, Sex Offender Registration & Notification: The
Constitution vs. Public Safety, 60 ALA. LAW. 112, 118 (1999).
227 Outpatient treatment costs from $5,000 to $15,000 a year, whereas incarceration costs
at least $22,000 without treatment. Fry-Bowers, supra note 58, at 925 n.264.
228 Doe v. Miller, 405 F.3d 700, 725 (8th Cir. 2005) (Melloy, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part), cert denied, 126 S. Ct. 757 (2005); People v. Leroy, 828 N.E.2d 769,
790-91 (Ill. App. Ct. 2005) (Kuehn, J., dissenting), appeal denied, 839 N.E.2d 1032 (Ill.
2005); see also Weems v. Little Rock Police Dep't, 453 F.3d 1010, 1017-18 (8th Cir. 2006)
(acknowledging these criticisms raised by the dissenting judge in Miller and Seering).
229 See, e.g., Alabama Strengthens Restrictions, supra note 20, at 939 ("Like many of
these laws, Alabama's poorly tailored [enhanced residency restriction law] fails to address
the vast majority of sex crimes committed against children, and its chances of preventing the
crimes it does target are small."); Henderson, supra note 29, at 813-14 ("If an offender's
only victims are historically teenagers or adults, imposing a residential restriction regarding
primary school zones is futile and ineffective.").
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[Instead,] this Act treats all offenders alike, without consideration of whether a
particular offender is likely to reoffend....230
Judge Kuehn noted at the beginning of his dissent that the record did not
even detail exactly what crime Leroy had committed as an eighteen-year
old, and "[w]ithout a better understanding of the nature of his offense,
particularly his choice of victim, we cannot assess Leroy's likelihood for
recidivism., 231 Information now posted on Leroy's Illinois Sex Offender
Database entry indicates he was convicted of a criminal sexual assault in
which the victim was over eighteen (when he himself was only eighteen),
which further raises questions of why Leroy should be banished from living
near an elementary school. 2
Dissenting in Miller, Judge Melloy similarly concluded that the
uniform application of residency restrictions made no sense without a
determination of ongoing individual risk.233 One of the plaintiffs, John Doe
II, was convicted of having consensual sex with a fifteen-year-old when he
was twenty years old, a crime that would not seem to indicate he was a
threat to toddlers in day care centers.234 Another plaintiff, John Doe VII,
was convicted of statutory rape in Kansas, an act not even criminalized in
Iowa, but he nonetheless had to register and live outside the two thousand
foot prohibited zone. 5
Some courts have expressly rejected the notion that a sex offender's
prior acts should guide the severity of his punishment, believing that this
would result in offenders merely receiving lighter sentences.236 But that
would not necessarily be the case. In Seering, Iowa officials enforced a two
thousand foot residency restriction from schools and day care centers
against the convicted offender while still allowing him to live with the
victim of his "lascivious conduct": his teenaged daughter. 7 If the Iowa
courts had employed a risk assessment criteria and tailored the sentence
accordingly, it is likely that they would have imposed restrictions on
Seering that were designed to protect his teenaged daughter and other
230 Leroy, 828 N.E.2d at 791 (Kuehn, J., dissenting).
231 Id. at 791 (Kuehn, J., dissenting).
232 Leroy Database Entry, supra note 2.
233 Miller, 405 F.3d at 726 (Melloy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
234 See id.
235 Id.
236 See e.g., State v. Strickland, 609 S.E.2d 253, 255-56 (N.C. Ct. App. 2005) (upholding
the probation standard that denied a convicted sex offender from gaining custody of his five-
year-old son, even though his conviction was for having sex with his thirteen-year-old sister-
in-law).
237 State v. Seering, 701 N.W.2d 655, 659 (Iowa 2005).
2006]
CALEB DURLING
teenaged females, rather than imposing broad and seemingly unrelated
restrictions on Seering's proximity to day care centers.
Some of the system's critics focus on how the risk assessment
instrument is devised. 38 If the criteria too heavily weigh "static risk
factors" that never change, like prior offenses and deviant sexual
preferences, inmates could permanently have no chance of lessening heavy
restrictions despite successfully demonstrating progress or completing
rehabilitation.239 Instead, critics believe the criteria must also consider
"dynamic risk factors," like "sexual deviancy and peer group associations,
difficulties with intimacy, the presence of deviant sexual fantasies, and
cognitive distortions regarding sexual offenses," that could be positively
affected by rehabilitation. 240  Kondo is also concerned that experts have
proven no more accurate on average than laymen at predicting exactly
which offenders will commit future sex crimes.2 41 Other critics contend
that problems with underreporting of all sex crimes lead to an
underestimation of offenders' dangerousness.242
Another concern is manipulation of the criteria to skew the results.
California, for example, has a multi-tiered system of risk evaluation, yet
assesses 82% of sex offenders as high risk,243 raising suspicions that the
tiered system has become a vehicle to hand out harsher sentences to most
offenders. Thus, procedural safeguards would need to be imposed,
including a periodic review of the assessments to ensure a reasonable
distribution of offenders across the risk tiers. Indeed, the potential for
prosecutorial abuse is a recurring problem with these proposed methods,2"
and periodic independent monitoring will be needed for all.
The use of risk assessment criteria to determine appropriate sentences
for convicted sex offenders, while not foolproof, would nonetheless be a
considerable improvement over the current method of meting out uniform
238 Kondo, supra note 93, at 202.
239 Id.
240 Id. at 202, 211-12 (footnotes omitted).
241 Id. at 203; see also Christopher Slobogin, The Civilization of the Criminal Law, 58
VAND. L. REv. 121, 144-45 (2005) (pointing out that the main criticism in the past of
sentencing tied to risk assessment was an inaccurate assessment instrument, and now a larger
body of research has led to better methods that can produce accurate profiles with a
probability of recidivism ranging from 1% to 80% risk over three years, so that concern
should be mollified).
242 See La Fond & Winick, supra note 77, at 1181 ("It is, therefore, very possible that sex
offenders may be more dangerous as a group than official records and recidivism research
indicate. If sex offenders are more dangerous, current methods of predicting sexual
recidivism may grossly under-predict sexual dangerousness.").
243 Fry-Bowers, supra note 58, at 897.
244 See discussion infra notes 284-291 and accompanying text.
[Vol. 97
NEVER GOING HOME
punishment to all. That said, assessment criteria would be a large step
forward in managing the risk of sex offenders. Such a system would
alleviate ex post facto concerns and mollify the critics who contend that
with the current residency restriction laws, "sex offenders are subject to the
residency restriction regardless of whether they pose a danger to the
population., 245 In addition, the use of risk assessment criteria and tailored
restrictions would allow states to better allocate their finite resources to
incarcerate and control high-risk offenders while letting the lowest risk
offenders return to society with appropriate minimal supervision. Narrowly
tailored residency restrictions, based on the circumstances of each
individual sex offender, would also be more likely to withstand judicial
scrutiny than those that are applied to all. For example, the Eighth Circuit
correctly concluded that the Arkansas residency restrictions predicated on a
finding of high risk on the assessment criteria seems more likely to
withstand judicial scrutiny than restrictions that indiscriminately apply to all
sex offenders:
In considering whether the Arkansas residency restriction is nonetheless so punitive in
effect as to negate the legislature's intent to create a civil, non-punitive regulatory
scheme, we believe that Arkansas law is on even stronger constitutional footing than
the Iowa statute. Unlike the Iowa law, the Arkansas statutory plan calls for a
particularized risk assessment of sex offenders, which increases the likelihood that the
residency restriction is not excessive in relation to the rational purpose of minimizing
the risk of sex crimes against minors. This fine-tuning of the restriction addresses the
principal concern of the dissenting judges who believed the Iowa statute violated the
Ex Post Facto Clause.
246
B. INDETERMINATE SENTENCING
Several states, including Washington and Colorado, have enacted
indeterminate, also known as open-ended, sentencing as a way to impose
longer prison sentences and more restrictive controls on high-risk sex
offenders who have served their full sentences and are to be released back
into the community. 247  Washington lawmakers passed the Sex Offender
245 Doe v. Miller, 298 F. Supp. 2d 844, 870 (S.D. Iowa 2004), rev'd, 405 F.3d 700 (8th
Cir. 2005), cert denied, 126 S. Ct. 757 (2005).
246 Weems v. Little Rock Police Dep't, 453 F.3d 1010, 1017 (8th Cir. 2006) (citing Doe
v. Miller, 405 F.3d 700, 725-26 (8th Cir. 2005), cert denied, 126 S. Ct. 757 (2005) (Melloy,
J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); State v. Seering, 701 N.W.2d 655, 672 (Iowa
2005) (Wiggins, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)).
247 See McKinney, supra note 19, at 310 (discussing Washington's law); COLO. DEP'T OF
CORR. ET AL., LIFETIME SUPERVISION OF SEX OFFENDERS-ANNUAL REPORT (2005), available
at http://dcj.state.co.us/odvsom/SexOffender/SOPdfs/Annual%20Report%202005.pdf, see
also discussion infra Section V.D (describing Colorado's sex offender reentry courts that
control offenders once they have been granted conditional release).
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Management Act (SOMA) to correct the state's lack of supervision for
these high-risk offenders. 248 Under SOMA, convicted offenders are given a
minimum and maximum sentence length.249  No less than ninety days
before the minimum sentence is set to end, there is a hearing before the
Indeterminate Sentencing Review Board (ISRB), which uses risk
assessment criteria to predict the offender's probability of recidivism.
250
The presumption is toward releasing the offender, unless the state can show
by a preponderance of the evidence that the offender is more likely than not
to commit another sex offense after being released. 5' If the ISRB finds the
offender to be more likely than not to re-offend, then the prisoner is
sentenced to another minimum term of no longer than two years. 52 This
review process repeats until the sex offender either wins release at the
board's hearing or completes the maximum term of his sentence. 3 Upon
release, the offender is placed on conditional parole, and the state can return
the offender to prison if he does not comply with the conditions of parole.
25 4
SOMA's advocates point to several advantages. First, indeterminate
sentencing is an openly criminal measure and does not masquerade as a
civil prevention,255 the legislative sleight of hand under which residency
restrictions are classified. 56 Second, the State has to make a "continuing
[showing] of dangerousness [for a] justification for continued
incarceration. 257 Therefore, the State must implement a risk management
assessment criteria 258 and allow those offenders of no or low risk of
recidivism to complete only their minimum sentence, concentrating state
resources on preventing further harm by high-risk offenders. Next, the
structure could provide incentive to incarcerated offenders to make a
concerted effort to reform to improve their chances of gaining release at
248 See McKinney, supra note 19, at 311-12.
249 Id. at 323.




254 Id. It is unclear from McKinney's article whether or not this conditional parole would
also be in effect in the instance that the offender had served the maximum sentences. See id.
That is to say, could the offender be sent back to prison if he already had completed his full
term and is noncompliant while on probation?
25 See id. at 331-33 ("[Tlhe system on its face is clearly punitive."); Rosell, supra note
52, at 429-30.
256 See discussion supra Section IV.B. A civil commitment regime also suffers from the
same problem as residency restrictions of being purportedly civil but in practice appearing to
be a criminal system. See discussion infra Section V.C.
257 McKinney, supra note 19, at 332.
258 Slobogin, supra note 241, at 144-45.
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their subsequent hearing and then receiving fewer restrictions upon their
parole. Conditional sentencing also enables state officials to include more
restrictions on offenders upon release, enabling more control by officials
over high-risk offenders.259
Lastly, in Washington, this method benefits the offenders upon release
from prison in two ways. First, the state is required to place the offender in
the least restrictive setting possible considering the offender's determined
risk level.260 Second, a provision preempts local land use codes when
offenders are placed back in the community.261  This latter provision is
vital, as Washington already had to scale back its civil commitment
program due to the high cost of lawsuits by municipalities protesting
offender outpatient placement in their community.
2 62
States' implementation of SOMA has revealed some problems. First,
in Washington, the offenders do not receive any treatment while in
prison.263 Defenders of the system support this decision as cost effective, 64
but it could lead to an endless cycle of lost hearings by imprisoned
offenders who cannot improve without the treatment that the system does
not provide. As a result, the indeterminate system then becomes a sentence
to maximum term in almost every case. Some legal scholars also wonder if
this is just the sentencing trend swinging back from strict guideline
sentencing toward ones of indeterminate length.2 65 Legislators scrapped
indeterminate sentencing during the "Law and Order" movement in the
1970s, as critics felt lenient judges used indeterminate sentences to let
criminals off too lightly.266 However, the solution reached at the time,
259 McKinney, supra note 19, at 333.
260 Id.
261 Id. at 324-25. State empowerment to place offenders in community outpatient
facilities cannot be overstated, as this Comment has already mentioned the sex offender in
California who, even after undergoing castration, was refused any outpatient placement and
lives in a trailer on the grounds of a prison, see supra notes 62-63 and accompanying text, as
well as a Chicago alderman agitating to push sex offenders out of the zip code where one-
tenth of Illinois's paroled offenders have been forced to live. See discussion supra Section
III.D.
262 See McKinney, supra note 19, at 314-15; Sarah Spierling, Note and Comment, Lock
Them Up and Throw Away the Key: How Washington's Violent Sexual Predator Law will
Shape the Future Balance Between Punishment and Prevention, 9 J.L. & POL'Y 879, 922-25
(2001).
263 McKinney, supra note 19, at 314.
264 Id.
265 See Marguerite Driessen & W. Cole Durham, American Law in a Time of Global
Interdependence: U.S. National Reports to the XVth International Congress of Comparative
Law: Section V." Sentencing Dissonances in the United States: The Shrinking Distance




"tough" determinate sentences, caused today's prison overcrowding
problems, which ironically now result in offenders being released at the
267earliest possible moment to relieve that overcrowding. One wonders,
then, if indeterminate sentencing will do any better at fixing this structural
flaw in our penal system.
The results in Colorado of indeterminate sentencing have shown
several other problems with the system's implementation. First, though the
state has set up a system of supervised release and indeterminate sentences,
the release portion has virtually never been used. This has happened partly
because, due to cuts to the program's counseling budget, imprisoned
offenders are not receiving the counseling that the law requires them to
complete before being eligible for supervised release.268 As a result
(although conceding that the program was only implemented in late 1998),
793 offenders have been sentenced under the program, but only 2 of 182
eligible prisoners have been granted parole and sent to community
corrections. 269 An additional 5 out of 14 who met the criteria for release to
community corrections are in a transitional community. 270 Thus, as seen
before with assessment criteria, reviewing officials are judging nearly every
offender as high risk when statistics strongly refute this belief.27 1 The result
is two-fold: a system on paper that has not really been tested by the realities
of managing actual offenders; and a continued refusal by parole boards to
believe that any offenders are actually low-risk and can be released back
into the community.
In conclusion, the systematic review process of imprisoned sex
offenders in indeterminate sentencing should better differentiate those high-
risk offenders who require long-term incarceration from lower risk
offenders who need only serve the minimum time. Furthermore, SOMA's
use of risk assessment criteria and tailored restrictions will result in more
effective control over the sex offenders who are released into the
community.
C. CIVIL COMMITMENT OF SEXUALLY VIOLENT PREDATORS
Often referred to as sexually violent predator (SVP) laws or sex
offender civil commitment laws (SOCCLs), 272 civil commitment regimes
267 Id. at 624.
268 See COLO. DEP'T OF CORR. ET AL., supra note 247, at 28.
269 Id. at 3, 7.
270 Id. at 7.
271 See discussion supra Sections III.A and V.A.
272 Lucken & Latina, supra note 104, at 15.
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are already in place in many states,273 including Illinois, 274 and have been
ruled constitutional on several occasions.275
Procedurally, a civil commitment regime is somewhat akin to an
indeterminate sentencing hearing process. After completing his prison
sentence, a sex offender is tested for mental illness.276 If the offender is
diagnosed to be suffering from a treatable mental illness, 277 then the
offender can be sent to civil but involuntary treatment.278 Once committed,
the offender undergoes mandatory therapy, which may require the offender
to admit to his past deviant acts and discuss his motivations for committing
them. 279  If the offender is found to have been treated for his mental
disability, then he is immediately released. 280 The committed offender must
have at least an annual review of his status, and is able to petition for a
review at any time. 28 1 However, the defendant does not have an absolute
right to be present when the review board decides on his status since the
commitment is civil.
282
Supporters see civil commitments as a valuable component of a
preventive justice system, complementing the indeterminate sentencing
regime discussed in Section V.B.283 Critics of civil commitments contend
the system suffers from several key flaws. First, prosecutors have taken
advantage of the regime's potential to hold offenders indefinitely and
sought commitment for offenders deemed high risk, regardless of whether
the offender actually suffers from the requisite mental illness. 284 "SOCCLs
have a sustained popularity among the public and policy makers. This
support exists largely because SOCCLs are not really about treatment.
Instead, they are about the incapacitation of society's most heinous
273 Slobogin, supra note 241, at 124 n.14. Seventeen states had such laws at the
beginning of 2005. Id.
274 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. 207/1-90 (2005).
275 See Seling v. Young, 531 U.S. 250 (2001); Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346
(1997); Allen v. Illinois, 478 U.S. 364 (1986).
276 See, e.g., M.X.L. v. N.J. Dep't of Human Servs./N.J. Dep't of Corr., 876 A.2d 869,
872 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2005).
277 Allen, 478 U.S. at 366, 369-70.
278 See, e.g., M.XL., 876 A.2d at 872.
279 Allen, 478 U.S. at 366-67; see Eric Janus & Wayne Logan, Substantive Due Process
and the Involuntary Confinement of Sexually Violent Predators, 35 CONN. L. REv. 319, 370-
72, 377-80 (2003); Lucken & Latina, supra note 104, at 25-27, 35-36.
280 See Allen, 478 U.S. at 369-70; M.XL., 876 A.2d at 875-76.
281 See Allen, 478 U.S. at 369 n.3; M.XL., 876 A.2d at 875-76.
282 Lucken & Latina, supra note 104, at 27-28.
283 See Slobogin, supra note 241, at 128; see also discussion supra Section V.B.
284 See Lucken & Latina, supra note 104, at 37; Jonathan Saltzman, Push is on to keep
sex criminals locked up, BOSTON GLOBE, Oct. 25, 2005, at Al.
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offenders. Thus, it matters little whether rehabilitation is achieved and
proper procedures are followed. 2 85  Critics note that legislators have
different tools available to handle high-risk offenders without mental
disabilities, such as increasing sentence lengths or eliminating parole, and
civil commitments should not be used for controlling those offenders. 86
Courts have compounded prosecutors' abuse of the system by not
carefully scrutinizing commitment requests. 287 Scholars found that in the
sixteen states with SVP laws, prosecutors win between 75% and nearly
100% of their cases to civilly commit offenders.288  As a result,
commitments have become de facto indeterminate sentencing, but without
the maximum sentence ceiling provided by SOMA. 2 89 As a result of the
prosecutorial abuse and the lack of judicial scrutiny, critics have concluded
that civil commitments are not a better reform, but just the favorite program
of this generation of prosecutors to lock up problematic sexual offenders,290
leading to a class of permanently incarcerated offenders who have
completed their sentences but cannot gain release.291
Cost is a second significant concern. Studies have shown that to
implement SVP laws costs $50,000 to $130,000 per year per offender, with
an average cost of about $100,000.292 This high cost would be a hard sell
politically, and could lead to legislators slashing funding for the treatment
component but keeping the involuntary commitment system in place.293
Civil commitments without adequate funding for treatment would result in
285 Lucken & Latina, supra note 104, at 37; see also Janus & Logan, supra note 279, at
320 (writing that SVPs, along with registration schemes, are "the comer-stones of what has
been aptly called America's 'preventive state,' which, rather than achieving social control by
means of avowedly penal regimes behind prison walls, seeks to 'identify and neutralize
dangerous individuals before they commit crimes by restricting their liberty in a variety of
ways').
286 Amy Jurgensmeier, Comment, Promises to Keep: The Continued Denial of
Constitutional Rights to Sexually Violent Predators, 41 WASHBURN L.J. 667, 683 (2001)
(summarizing the dilemma as: "If the desired result was to keep sexual predator confined for
life to protect the community against the chance that they might re-offend, the legislature
could have increased sentences for such crimes or revised sentencing guidelines").
287 See La Fond & Winick, supra note 77, at 1176.
288 id.
289 Id.
290 Lucken & Latina, supra note 104, at 38.
291 Janus & Logan, supra note 279, at 383.
292 Rosell, supra note 52, at 428.
293 Cf COLO. DEP'T OF CORR. ET AL., supra note 247, at 28 (describing how the state's
indeterminate sentencing predicated on mandatory prisoner counseling is already suffering
from budget cuts resulting in a shortage of counselors, making it that much harder for sex
offenders to have any chance at prevailing at a indeterminate sentencing hearing).
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SVP offenders being permanently institutionalized with little chance of
rehabilitation and release.
Like many available options, civil commitments are appropriate for
some offenders, but certainly not all. For those offenders with treatable
mental illnesses who do pose a recidivism risk, the state would be wise to
use the civil commitment regime to thoroughly treat the offender before
considering release. However, the problem with civil commitments is the
temptation for state abuse. If courts become lax in their scrutiny of
increasing claims by the state of mental illness among offenders about to be
released from prison, while legislators cut funding for therapy available to
committed offenders, the result could easily be that civil commitments
become a shadow penal system that holds a significant percentage of
offenders indefinitely. Indeed, even proponents admit the laws have
already been misused, as "SVP laws thus commit some sex offenders who
would not reoffend if released or placed in an outpatient program under
aggressive supervision., 294 These nagging problems need to be addressed
for civil commitments to be a legitimate state tool used to manage a discrete
subset of sex offenders.
D. SEX OFFENDER REENTRY COURTS
Sex offender reentry courts follow a recent trend of specialized courts,
such as those for drug treatment, domestic violence, and mental health.2 95
Colorado has implemented sex offender reentry courts to much acclaim.296
The reentry court is at the center of a comprehensive approach to
managing sex offenders, handling the offenders' case from the bail hearing
through to conditional release.297 As a specialized court, judges and counsel
appearing in this court would receive training on effective sex offender risk
management practices.298 The judge plays an active role as the "reentry
manager" of the "interagency team" in charge of the offender's case,
supervising the treatment and holding the offender accountable for relapses
or lack of effort in treatment.299
294 La Fond & Winick, supra note 77, at 1176.
295 Id. at 1192-93.
296 See discussion infra notes 307-310 and accompanying text.
297 Madeline Carter, Kurt Bumby & Thomas Talbot, Promoting Offender Accountability
and Community Safety Through the Comprehensive Approach to Sex Offender Management,
34 SETON HALL L. REv. 1273, 1275-76 (2004).
298 Id. at 1280-81.
299 Kim English, The Containment Approach to Managing Sex Offenders, 34 SETON
HALL L. REV. 1255, 1259-60 (2004); La Fond & Winick, supra note 77, at 1193-94, 1196.
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Polygraph testing plays a large role throughout the reentry court's
processes. Bail is granted based on an initial assessment of risk level using
actuarial tables and polygraph testing. 300 Those offenders determined to be
low risk based on actuarial tables and the polygraph results can receive a
deferred sentence for which the offender submits to rigorous treatment but
is conditionally allowed to return to the community. 30 1 The reentry court
302athen controls the offender's release and level of supervision. Normally, a
gradual release process is used, with the offender gaining privileges and
shedding restrictions upon satisfying successive levels of expectations.30 3
While the offender is on a deferred sentence, officials can exercise the more
intrusive powers available to parole and probation officers, including
warrantless searches of the offender's house and person so long as there are
reasonable grounds.30 4
During treatment, the reentry court's supervision of the offender
continues to rely heavily on results from mandatory polygraph testing,
studying the offender's responses to specific questions about his past acts,
and predilections to focus on relapse prevention components.30 5 If the
offender refuses to comply with further polygraph testing or demonstrates
high-risk behavior, the court has a wide range of options to tighten control
over the offender, which range from increasing surveillance and mandating
additional treatment sessions to revoking community release and returning
the offender to prison.3 °6
Proponents believe this system offers the best of both worlds, as it is
cheaper and more targeted than permanent incarceration for all, but still
satisfies the public mandate for strong control over sex offenders.30 7
Furthermore, sex offenders are incentivized to reform, as they will only
gain freedom by taking the treatment seriously and complying with the
polygraph testing, with the punishment that a failure to comply will result in
300 La Fond & Winick, supra note 77, at 1196.
301 Id.
302 Id. at 1188-89.
303 Id.
304 Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868, 880 (1987). In a recent United States Supreme
Court decision, the majority held that a probationer, by agreeing to the terms of his
conditional freedom, accepted that his "person, property, place of residence, vehicle [and]
personal effects [could be searched] at anytime, with or without a search warrant, warrant of
arrest or reasonable cause by any probation officer or law enforcement officer." United
States v. Knights, 534 U.S. 112, 114 (2001) (citation omitted).
305 Carter, Bumby & Talbot, supra note 297, at 1285-88; English, supra note 299, at
1266.
306 English, supra note 299, at 1266-68 (describing the consequences available for
noncompliance as a "powerful incentive").
307 La Fond & Winick, supra note 77, at 1186.
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fewer privileges and a possible return to prison.3 °8 The system's immediate
consequences, including reincarceration, also help to overcome the sex
offender's entrenched deviant behavior and fantasies. 30 9 Proponents also
contend that using the polygraph while asking offender questions about his
prior acts is the best way to solve the alleged underreporting problem with
sex offenses, as the offender will be held accountable for, and know his
variable sentence depends upon, his truthfulness and willingness to comply
with all requests made of him.310
Critics are not convinced of the system's viability and legality. First,
on a practical level, it would involve a massive financial effort to train
judges and lawyers, coordinate interagency teams, and set up a separate
court system for handling the offenders.31 In an environment where many
in the public simply want sex offenders locked up forever, devoting large
amounts of money to halfway houses, counseling, and specially trained
judges and probation officers for sex offender rehabilitation seems
politically unrealistic.
Reliance on polygraph testing is another serious concern with the
current procedure in Colorado's reentry courts. Proponents claim that
polygraphs are 85% correct.31 2  Illinois courts, among others, consider
polygraph results too unreliable to be admitted as evidence, as the
polygraph "impinges upon the integrity of our judicial system.,
313
Admittedly, the Supreme Court in McKune v. Lile upheld the use of
compelled polygraph testing on imprisoned sex offenders as serving a
legitimate prison purpose,314 but it remains true that courts are skeptical
about the reliability and appropriate role of polygraphs in our judicial
system.
This unreliability is compounded in the Colorado system by an
incentive on the part of the offender to confess to sexual crimes they may
308 Id.
309 English, supra note 299, at 1263.
310 Id.; La Fond & Winick, supra note 77, at 1204-05.
311 See also English, supra note 299, at 1264 (asserting that probation officers' caseloads
would need to be lowered to twenty or twenty-five at the maximum, and the state would
need to have twenty-four hour halfway houses open in every jurisdiction).
312 La Fond & Winick, supra note 77, at 1201-03.
313 People v. Baynes, 430 N.E.2d 1070, 1079 (I11. 1981); see also People v. Binion, 832
N.E.2d 875, 884 (I11. 2005) ("The polygraph is not sufficiently reliable to establish guilt or
innocence, yet its quasi-scientific nature could lead a jury to give the evidence undue weight
despite its unreliability."); People v. Jackson, 781 N.E.2d 278, 281-82 (I11. 2002); People v.
Bock, 827 N.E.2d 1089, 1095 (I11. App. Ct. 2005), appeal denied, 839 N.E.2d 1027 (I11.
2005) ("Due to the inherent unreliability of [polygraph] examinations, evidence regarding
their administration is generally inadmissible in Illinois.").
314 See McKune v. Lile, 536 U.S. 24, 35-41 (2002).
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not have committed. The Colorado practitioners who promote reentry
courts believe that sex crimes are massively underreported, with one
practitioner claiming the underreporting ratio is one arrest to every thirty
actual acts of child rape or molestation, a figure she reached from the results
of these compulsory polygraph tests.3" 5
There are two responses to this shocking claim. First, this discrepancy
is most likely exaggerated--especially when so many studies and meta-
analyses have been completed about sex offender recidivism by
disinterested scholars and the government, none of which have hinted at
any sort of underreporting ratio approaching thirty to one.316 Second, this
claim calls into question the practitioners' motivations when testing these
Colorado sex offenders. If the practitioners involved have an agenda to
"find" undocumented sex offenses, one wonders if offenders realize that
extravagant "confessions" in which they "tell all" mean a better chance that
the prosecutor will declare the offender compliant with the testing, and thus
eligible for release and lighter restrictions. This perverse incentive for an
offender to lie and fabricate sex offenses never committed exemplifies the
problems with basing a system on already unreliable polygraph testing.
In conclusion, reentry courts offer an interesting synthesis of several
ideas. They use assessment criteria, flexible sentencing, and a more
graduated approach to punishment. However, the costs of funding the
parole and monitoring program could be financially burdensome and
politically difficult to sustain. Further, a system heavily reliant on
polygraph results, evidence found to be unreliable and inadmissible by
other states, will not be readily adopted elsewhere. But those limitations
should not prevent a state or court from implementing the useful practices
in this model that bridge the gap between punishment and treatment
VI. CONCLUSION
The handling of sex offenders is one of the most well-publicized
criminal justice issues in our nation today, and states are trying a wide
variety of strategies to manage sex offender risk of recidivism. Some
strategies, like registration, appear to be here to stay, for better or for worse.
Others, such as residency restrictions, have not faced Supreme Court
scrutiny and very well may fail based on their retroactive, ex post facto
application in a uniform manner to all offenders, regardless of demonstrated
risk of recidivism and elapsed time since conviction. These flawed
315 English, supra note 299, at 1266-67.
316 See discussion supra Section III.A.
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strategies should be modified or replaced by a scheme that borrows from
the best practices of various states.
First, courts need to be more willing to take the time to tailor the
restrictions and punishments imposed on sex offenders to the crimes
committed, the probability of the offenders' recidivism, and their likely
victims. Risk assessment criteria like Nebraska's would allow courts to
factor criminal history and future risk of harm into sentencing and
conditional release, ending the practice of uniformly-applied laws and
instead efficiently focusing police resources on the highest risk offenders.
Further, states should use the risk assessment criteria to grant longer,
indeterminate sentences for the minority of sex offenders who pose a high
risk of recidivism, while providing treatment for imprisoned offenders to
enable those that can improve to do so. For those sex offenders continuing
to suffer from serious but treatable mental disabilities, a secure civil
commitment regime focused on rehabilitation would be the proper fit.
Lastly, a specialized sex offender reentry court would be beneficial in
ensuring continuity and expertise throughout this process, which would
prevent high-risk offenders from being inadvertently released while better
identifying the low-risk offenders who should serve their sentence and then
be allowed to reintegrate into society with decreasing restrictions over time.
The remaining problem is how to handle the offenders like Patrick
Leroy who have been living in the community for years and now are
affected by retroactive laws. States could offer a deal to these offenders
whereby they undergo the risk assessment criteria. For those offenders
judged a low risk, as presumably most would be since they have lived
without incident in the community for years or decades, the state would
relax the restrictions on these offenders to registration only. For those
found to be higher risk, reincarceration is legally out of the question, but the
state could focus its surveillance and treatment resources on these
offenders, and would be better able to catch the offenders before they
commit their next sex offense.
Federalism has enabled states to implement many different strategies
to handle sex offender risk management. It is now time for the best
practices of risk management to be recognized and modeled across the
nation, concentrating resources and policing on the few high-risk offenders
while letting the many low-risk offenders return home. This strategy makes
us safer and makes sense.
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